President George Bush violated the logic of his own diplomacy when he prematurely abandoned sanctions and launched into war. By the momentum of its own policy, the Bush administration has told the world that it intends not only to evict Iraq from Kuwait but also to overthrow President Saddam Hussein. This confusion of means and ends gives President Hussein the opportunity to orchestrate a peace initiative that would force the United States either to accept him as leader of a still-intact Iraqi nation and idol of most of the Arab peoples or to carry on the war, thereby fracturing the coalition of forces and imperiling United Nations sponsorship.
With so many diplomatic options available to both sides, why did war come about? Dismiss out of hand those conspiracy theories which contend that the United States lured Saddam Hussein into invading Kuwait, thereby providing the Bush administration with a pretext for crushing him. Indeed, it is more plausible to argue that as late as July 25 of last year, the Bush administration was trying to mend its relations with Iraq at the expense of Kuwait. When Saddam Hussein spoke angrily about Kuwait because it was keeping oil prices artificially low, Ambassador April Glaspie said that the United States recognized the need for increased revenues to rebuild Iraq’s war-torn economy and stated, “We have no opinion on… your border disagreement with Kuwait.” To the Iraqi leader this was a direct message that the U. S. would not object if he forced Kuwait to yield the disputed Rumalia oil fields and the two uninhabited islands of Babiyan and Wasan necessary to the security of the deep-water canal Iraq intends to build to the inland port of Basra. Instead of accepting this significant concession, Saddam Hussein gambled that he could get away with a takeover of the entire country of Kuwait.
Saddam Hussein’s gamble would have failed had the U. S. not given in to rash militarism. In the days following the invasion of Kuwait, the world witnessed a blend of subtle and elegant diplomacy missing from the conduct of American foreign affairs since Dean Acheson was secretary of state. With the United States discreetly in the lead, the Security Council voted to condemn the invasion and imposed a near-total trade embargo on Iraq. Turkey cut the two pipelines that carried over 80 percent of Iraq’s oil to world markets. Egypt and Syria sent troops in significant numbers to help convince the world that this was not Western imperialism on the march.
With the world united against Iraq, the United States had only to ratchet up the diplomatic pressures while the economic blockade—97 percent effective according to the CIA—did its work. Instead the Bush administration raised the troop levels in Saudi Arabia from a trip-wire force of under thirty thousand to a huge army of four hundred thousand. This ill-considered move put the world inexorably on the path to war.
Sanctions did not fail. The embargo had cut off Saddam Hussein’s lifeline to the world. Thus, it was only a matter of time before he would have had to find a face-saving exit. War, however, will fail because the Bush administration has changed its objectives and thereby handed Saddam Hussein a trump card that he can play the moment he judges he has squeezed every drop of political advantage out of the conflict.
The UN Security Council has authorized the use of force only to drive Iraq from Kuwait. Yet as U.S. troop strength has grown, the administration’s rhetoric became more warlike. No partial withdrawal. No linkage. President Bush compared Saddam Hussein with Hitler and talked of the moral imperatives that govern the struggle between “good and evil, fight and wrong.” Today, hardliners in the administration seem almost desperate to head off diplomatic initiatives that could stop the war.
Secretary of State James Baker appears to be the only major figure in the administration who stands for limiting the war to its original objective. When Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh signed a joint statement that peace would be possible if Iraq would make an unequivocal commitment to withdraw from Kuwait, the White House greeted this diplomatic move with stunned disbelief and tried to bury the story.
The bombing may have done grave damage to Iraq, but the war has done great things for Saddam Hussein. He has inflicted missile damage on Tel Aviv, has sent his tanks into Saudi Arabia to kill American soldiers, and has shot down U.S. aircraft. To the frustrated, angry, and impoverished peoples of the Middle East, Saddam Hussein is the new champion who has challenged the West. His popularity threatens the stability of several Arab governments that have supported the United States.
To prolong the war will only insure the further destruction of Iraq and will do little to add to the impressive political stature that Saddam Hussein has already achieved. Therefore, the next few weeks may see him ready to accept a version of the joint U.S.-Soviet statement that calls for an end to the war if Iraq agrees to leave Kuwait. The plan is all the more attractive to Iraq because it links this withdrawal to a promise to deal with the “cause of instability and the sources of conflict, including the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
If Saddam Hussein were to accept a version of the Baker-Bessmertnykh peace proposal, he would present the Bush administration with a stark choice. Hard-liners led by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney will argue that it would be folly to stop the war with victory so close. They will point out that if Saddam Hussein survives he wins and that now is the time to crush a ruthless tyrant before he becomes the premier leader of the Arab world. Secretary of State Baker will insist that to reject the peace plan would divide the coalition, divide the United States from its allies, and give substance to the charge that the United States regards the United Nations only as a tool to advance its own interests.
The United States will almost surely pay a huge price for abandoning the sanctions policy that offered the best hope of bringing down Saddam Hussein and insuring that a moderate government would take over. By resorting to war the U.S. has inflamed Arab nationalism, and made it unlikely that the United Nations will ever again unite effectively against an aggressor under U.S. leadership.
