The last-minute reprieve for Saddam Hussein, negotiated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, has forestalled certain military action against Iraq by the United States-at least unless and until Iraq once more blatantly impedes the work of the UN arms inspectors. Most knowledgeable observers agree that whether Iraq will cheat is not in question, only when. Iraq’s envoy to the UN has already begun to undermine the authority of Richard Butler, the chairman of the UN’s inspection program, by asserting that diplomats, not Butler’s professionals, will control the inspections of so-called "presidential palaces." In short, it seems clear that the dilemma of what to do about Iraq’s possession of biological and chemical weapons and defiance of the UN has not been resolved, but only put on hold.

It is equally obvious that no one, including the Clinton administration, was very happy with the idea of a punitive bombing campaign. A fearsome toll could have been extracted from Iraqi military forces and capabilities-and doubtless that reality was what induced Saddam to back down from his demands for limiting the scope of UN inspections. When dealing with a regime like Iraq’s, a willingness to use force is indispensable to keeping the peace and to bringing about some measure of international order and justice. As Secretary General Annan said about his own dealings with Iraq, "You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force."

Still, bombing would almost inevitably have inflicted civilian casualties on a population already impoverished by seven years of UN economic sanctions and terrorized for decades by its putative leader. Worse, although bombing would have weakened Iraq’s conventional military power, it was unlikely to destroy much, if any, of the regime’s biological and chemical capability. In short, containing Iraq and the threat its weapons of mass destruction present to the stability of the entire region is going to continue to be a kind of high-stakes poker game where all parties involved are unwilling to leave the table but desperate not to have their bluffs called.

Many fair-minded people are uncomfortable with the preeminent role the United States seems fated to play in this and other international conflicts. What would be lost, they ask, if the U.S. relented, allowing the weapons inspections and the sanctions to be ended? Isn’t Iraq bankrupt and militarily impotent at this point? Does it present a real threat to its neighbors? Is not continuing to impose such suffering on the Iraqi people out of all proportion to whatever good the sanctions might achieve in hobbling Iraq’s war machine?

There are no easy answers to these questions. Certainly, the Clinton administration must make a more persuasive and consistent case to the American people and to the international community concerning the imperative of disarming Iraq. However, it is important to repeat again that the principal obstacle to the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people is Saddam Hussein’s regime, not the sanctions or U.S. policy concerning weapons inspection. Iraq’s conventional military power has indeed been significantly reduced. But what complicates any just-war assessment of proportionality is the disproportionate danger posed by biological and chemical weapons-the fact that only a few such weapons can endanger the lives of millions, and perhaps the very peace of the world. Yes, other nations possess similar weapons. However, no other nation but Iraq has demonstrated a willingness to use them.

Moreover, in trying to assess the magnitude of the threat presented by Iraq’s refusal to account for all its weapons, some important facts bear repeating. It should be remembered that the UN has documented that during the 1991 Gulf War Iraq built and loaded twenty-five germ warheads using botulinum toxin, anthrax, and aflatoxin on missiles capable of striking targets 400 miles away. As well as threatening U.S. forces, Iraq targeted Israel with these missiles and with remote-controlled planes equipped with germ bombs. Thankfully, none were launched. However, Iraq has yet to account for at least 150 of those weapons. The likely consequence of any possible future attack on Israel-the retaliatory use of nuclear weapons-certainly represents a far greater threat to Iraqi civilians than either sanctions or any limited U.S. bombing campaign.

There are moral limits to what the U.S. should do and practical limits to what it can do about Iraq. But doing all that can justly be done to deprive Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction remains one of the best ways the U.S. can advance peace in the Middle East.