Much of the world’s attention has rightly been focused on the catastrophic loss of life caused by the tsunami that swept across the Indian Ocean last month, reminding us in the most horrific way that nature’s capriciousness can be as deadly as man’s own enmity or folly. As the nations of the world scramble to provide relief for the survivors, the number of the dead is now estimated at 140,000 and rising. The human toll and the scope of the destruction left behind by the ocean are nearly impossible to grasp.

It is perhaps just as sobering, then, to be reminded that estimates of the Iraqi loss of life following the U.S. invasion and occupation of that country are of a similar magnitude. U.S. deaths in Iraq are also mounting, now nearing 1,400, with the number of seriously wounded approaching 11,000. By some estimates, the fierceness of the fighting rivals anything seen in Vietnam or World War II. As Peter Dula wrote in our December 3, 2004, issue (“The War in Iraq”), “Iraq is a catastrophe-on all accounts.” Yet nature’s capriciousness had nothing to do with bringing this tragedy about. Responsibility for this disaster lies squarely on the shoulders of President George W. Bush, who chose to launch an unjustified and unnecessary war, and whose management of the occupation and “stabilization” of Iraq has been as destructive as any natural calamity.

Every day brings news of more terrorism and death in Iraq, and confirms the folly of this administration’s attempt to destroy Islamic radicalism-a dangerous ideology but not a place-by going to war with a nation-state. Yet last month the president awarded the Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian award, to three architects of his failed policy: former Iraqi administrator Paul Bremer, retired General Tommy Franks, and George Tenet, the CIA director who told the president what he wanted to hear about Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. Even some of Bush’s supporters questioned his politicization of the Medal of Freedom.

The president’s use of the war on terror for his own political ends is hardly surprising. His campaign for reelection was based on fearmongering and deception. Think of the Orwellian logic behind the idea that we must fight the “terrorists” in Iraq, who had no ties to Al Qaeda, so we don’t have to fight them here. Or the way Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney repeatedly inflated the number and the reliability of the Iraqi security forces in training. Bush finally conceded in a press conference last month what was plain fact for more than a year: Iraqi security forces are not ready to take on the insurgency, and won’t be for the foreseeable future.

Fear of retribution is certainly one reason Iraqis have been unwilling to risk their lives against the insurgents. The larger reason is lack of motivation and loyalty. The United States is seen by most Iraqis as an occupier-and an inept one-not a liberator. Even our few allies, the so-called coalition of the willing, have all but disappeared. As Stanley Hoffman has written (“Out of Iraq,” New York Review of Books, October 21, 2004), the U.S. presence in Iraq is not a catalyst for the possible emergence of democracy, but an obstacle to it. The counterinsurgency has gotten stronger each month, not weaker. The destruction of Falluja, and the increasingly indiscriminate use of force by U.S. soldiers, are fueling the rebellion, not suppressing it.

It has long been clear that there were never enough U.S. troops to keep order in Iraq. It is increasingly clear that not even twice as many U.S. troops could have done the job. Imposing democracy is, finally, a contradiction in terms. Hoffman does not pretend that a U.S. withdrawal will necessarily bring a resolution to the underlying conflict among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. The Sunnis’ unwillingness to be governed by a Shiite majority may make civil war and Iraq’s disintegration nearly inevitable. In a best-case scenario, it might lead to an alliance among Shiites, Kurds, and moderate Sunnis that would have the necessary legitimacy to defeat the insurgency. It should be understood, however, that the United States can’t win this war by itself. U.S. unilateralism has failed, and no end to the chaos is possible until we find a way to share with other nations the burden of putting Iraq together again. A preeminent American presence, Hoffman argues, will result in a decade of counterinsurgency that will not make the U.S. more secure or advance the cause of democracy in the Middle East. The road to peace lies elsewhere, either internally, or with the UN and regional organizations. “Recognizing the limits of America’s vast military power might, paradoxically, do more than anything else to increase American influence in the world,” Hoffman concludes.

Unfortunately, recognizing limits and admitting errors are not words in this president’s vocabulary. The result, in a word, has been disastrous. ■

January 4, 2005