son's re-election. But Johnson is a product of the Congressional system that needs reform; indeed, he epitomizes its values. For him, managing Congress is not a matter of necessity dictated by prudent calculation as it was for Kennedy; rather, this is the only kind of politics he understands. He communicates no sense of a coherent program unfolding now and into the future. He is all tactics and very little strategy.

Over and above specific items of the Kennedy program such as Medicare or aid to education that might have been achieved if the late President had won an overwhelming vote of confidence next year, there was also the quiet effort to change the tone and quality of public life. Here, too, progress during these past three years had been slow; it had consisted mostly of speeches, gestures, and the Presidential example. But, at least, here again there was a sense of purpose and direction. Kennedy, for example, esteemed intellectuals and gave his Administration an Ivy League tone markedly different from the Chamber of Commerce atmosphere of the Eisenhower years or the county courthouse folksiness of the Truman period. He did not tackle the networks and big advertisers head-on, but he did appoint Newton Minow and William Henry as successive chairmen of the Federal Communications Commission. Minow dared to characterize the industry as "a vast wasteland" and to propose numerous reforms. Henry has recently moved to activate the commission's moribund authority to regulate the length and frequency of radio and television commercials. Will President Johnson, whose wife owns radio and television stations in Austin, Texas, lend any support to this particularly reform?

Kennedy made some of the best appointments in history to the regulatory commissions. Johnson, on the other hand, led the shocking assault in 1949 on Federal Power Commission Chairman Leland Olds and blocked his re-confirmation by the Senate. In 1956, he pushed through the Senate the bill to free the natural gas industry from federal regulation even after the disclosure that industry lobbyists were trying to buy votes for the bill. My purpose is not to draw any misleading white-and-black contrasts between the two Presidents. Mr. Johnson is clearly entitled to write his own Presidential record starting afresh. But in recent days many people in and out of government here could not help but recall these facts from the past. Such memories have served only to provide discouragement which deepened the grief about the recent tragedy.

Three years is too brief a period to be described as an "era," but even in that short time John Kennedy had imposed on the rush of events the unity of his own personal pattern. It was a pattern composed of political sophistication and intellectual distinction, of moral commitment and artistic good taste. There was the hope among those who were the late President's colleagues and supporters that given another five years in the White House, he could have a definable impact in shifting the values of this generation of Americans away from mere money-making and the advancement of self. Whether it was the graceful eloquence of his speeches or the appointment of a White House consultant on the arts or the founding of the Peace Corps, Kennedy in numerous ways imparted reality to that hope. It now lies dead with him, and many in Washington feel the poorer for its loss. WILLIAM V. SHANNON

(Mr. Shannon is the Commonweal's regular correspondent in Washington.)

Walter Dean Burnham

After JFK—What?

Men do make history; as the President's assassination reminded us, individuals make a profound difference in human affairs

TODAY EACH of us, in his own way and for his own reasons, mourns a President. It seems almost improper —not to mention premature and speculative—to hazard an appraisal of what John F. Kennedy's death means to our polity so soon after the event. It can only be said that the business of the country will go forward, as it must, despite this irreparable loss; and that we must seek to regain our bearings as promptly and rationally as possible under these extraordinarily trying circumstances.

The brutal assassination of President Kennedy has

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, a frequent contributor to these pages, is now doing research on voting patterns at the University of Michigan.

forced us all to pause and take a long-overdue inventory of ourselves. Among many other things, it reminds us most forcefully that men *do* make history, that individuals—especially those in high places of responsibility—*do* make a profound difference in human affairs. How poignantly that lesson has been etched in our consciousness now! All previous calculations of the future, especially the near and political future, have been swept into oblivion by an assassin's bullet. That bullet killed far more than the physical body of John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

The first political fact of the era which began on November 22, 1963, is Lyndon Johnson's sudden accession to the Presidency. What can this abrupt turn of events mean? We may begin with one fairly fixed bearing: President Johnson can almost certainly be expected for some time to come to carry forward the broad substance of the late President's policies at home and abroad. For some time to come, perhaps indeed until the conventions and election of next year, a marked continuity in policy will manifest itself, compelled by two imperatives: (1) the imperative which arises from a continuing national interest in foreign affairs, broadly perceived in the same way by most of our political leaders, whether Democratic or moderate-to-liberal Republican; and (2) the particularly compelling political imperative at home which arises mainly from the nature of the Democratic party's national mass clientele.

Indeed, Lyndon Johnson as a Southerner—the first since the accession of another Johnson to Presidential power after another assassination a century ago—will almost surely feel it necessary to demonstrate in no uncertain terms that he has indeed transcended sectional origins and assumed genuinely national stature; and he will no doubt also have many other reasons besides those of political prudence for making this demonstration. At the very least, this should mean that the Johnson Administration will make the Kennedy Administration's major domestic policy objectives—perhaps especially in the civil-rights field—its own. That in itself should be a great deal; and if the political style of the new President and the aides with whom he will soon surround himself cannot possibly be the same as those of his predecessor, that is merely one part of a loss which can never wholly be made good.

LOOKING AHEAD, it seems virtually certain that President Johnson will be nominated at Atlantic City next summer unless he should take the extremely unlikely step of radically offending vital interests in the dominant Northern wing of the party. Not since Chester A. Arthur in 1884 has an incumbent President who wished to continue in office been denied his party's nomination. There can be little doubt that Mr. Johnson will wish to continue in office. In view of the obvious fact that President Kennedy's assassination has blasted a gaping hole in the Democratic party's national leadership, with no single visible successor except Mr. Johnson in sight, this eighty-year precedent is not likely to be disturbed by the 1964 Democratic convention.

But there is another consideration which sooner or later must be weighed. President Johnson's greatest repute over the years has been as a superb legislative tactician, a master of what James M. Burns has called "broker politics." Two questions arise concerning this record.

The first one, which can only be answered when he has had a chance to show what he can do, is whether this political style—so perfectly attuned to a collegial body with no significant traces of party discipline—can be successfully transferred to the exercise of Presidential power. Certainly the offices of Majority Leader of the Senate and President of the United States differ so completely from each other, and the imperatives of Presidential leadership are so uniquely tied to that particular office, that any attempt to carry over these legislative tactics unchanged seems bound to end in failure. But such an attempt, in all probability, will not be made; we can only wait and see.

The second question concerns Mr. Johnson's continuing, ambiguous position within the Democratic party as a whole. In his role as ringmaster of the Senate, Lyndon Johnson found himself roughly midway in the liberal-conservative political spectrum of the Senate as a whole—a position which placed him quite far to the right of most Democrats in the party's urban-industrial Northern heartland. As most of us recall, he was bitterly opposed by liberal delegations at Los Angeles in 1960, even after John F. Kennedy had told the convention that Johnson was his choice for the vice-presidential nomination. While it is undoubtedly true that Mr. Johnson has found his way to a national and international constituency in the past few years, it is also equally true that he has remained rather conspicuously identified with the more conservative wing of the Texas Democratic party and has used his influence to promote that wing's political fortunes. Indeed, it was partly to repair the damage caused by the bitter infighting within

that state party that President Kennedy made the trip which ended in his death.

After the spasm of national unity which now encloses our new President has finally passed, this ambiguity of his domestic position will probably emerge as the most pressing item on his political agenda. No disrespect is intended when we point out that Lyndon B. Johnson has remained rather alien in his personality, his political style and his political actions from the rank and file of Northern liberal opinion. With the best will in the world on both sides, he will probably face a most exacting task in rallying that opinion behind him with the unity and cohesion which will be needed if the 1964 election is to be won.

THE NEW FRONTIER as an intellectual and cultural experience is dead. Very shortly the special political style, the tone, of the new Administration will begin to emerge with changes in personnel and policies. Since the Presidency is so uniquely a symbolic office—as those of us who lived through the weekend of the last Sunday after Pentecost will never forget—those whose cultural and intellectual roots lie east of the Mississippi and north of the Potomac are not likely to find these changes easy to accept. For the sake of political clarity, if nothing else, it can only be hoped that if the policies are in the tradition of the national Democratic party, the changes in style and tone will be perceived to be what they are—accidentals, not essentials. In any case, President Johnson has inherited a constituency. Now, and within a twelve month period, he must win it as his own.

It would follow from this that the Republican party's prospects for 1964 have probably improved though, paradoxically, very likely at Senator Goldwater's expense. Of course, the political confusion which follows in the wake of the assassination affects the Republicans no less than the Democrats. In one respect, at least, President Johnson will be rather hard to attack, for he will have been in office less than a year by election day of 1964. But the knife cuts both ways. Johnson will scarcely have had much chance to develop a firm hold over the public mind—or perhaps even over some of the coalitional elements within the Democratic party—in so short a time. If the sectional image persists, and if there are defections from his standard among Northern minorities, middle classes and intellectuals who would have rallied to his predecessor, Republicanism of a certain sort might well inherit this legacy.

There are a number of reasons for supposing that President Kennedy's assassination may have critically dimmed Senator Goldwater's prospects for the Republican nomination. The most immediately obvious consideration is that Goldwater's strategy has rested heavily upon powerful anti-Kennedy sentiments in the South and much of the West. That strategy is now valueless, not only because President Kennedy himself is dead, but also because President Johnson will presumably enjoy his maximum support in just those parts of the country.

Another factor is also of considerable importance. To some degree at least, Goldwater's boom has been the product of Republican awareness that President Kennedy would very probably have been re-elected next year. This expectation of defeat seems to have given some play to the political fundamentalists who, strong as always in Republican Congressional delegations, have been shut out of the party's national convention for more than a quarter-century. But now the Republican nomination *means* something, provided that the G.O.P. has the wit to perceive the kind of candidate needed and the human resources to find and nominate him.

This is now quite a new ball game. Consequently, such a candidate cannot be Senator Goldwater. Rather he must be a man who can appeal to the urban centers of the Northeast, a man who stands visibly to the left of the party's center and can seriously hope to make inroads into President Johnson's strength in areas where he may be weak. Were it not for his divorce and remarriage, Governor Rockefeller would be a nearly ideal Republican candidate under these new circumstances. But they make him a risky prospect and remain, as before, massive impediments to his ambitions.

There is a final factor which may vitally contribute to Senator Goldwater's political eclipse, though it is much too early to suggest it save as a possibility. The many eulogies of our late President have tended to strike a common and most appropriate note: that John F. Kennedy died a victim of the festering political hatreds and fanaticisms which for years have been permitted to infect our national bloodstream. If President Kennedy's Administration meant anything, it meant inflexible, if often good-humored and tolerant, opposition to this hatred and extremism. It meant a political moderation which was not simply the flabby result of unconcerned compromise, but was an active and creative tension between transcendent goals dimly seen

and the recognition that human and political instrumentalities had to be relied upon to reach them. The fatal shot itself may have been fired by a woefully miseducated creature who called himself a leftist; but the critique of political intolerance and fanaticism, whether of far left or far right, stands.

SENATOR GOLDWATER is not himself one of these apostles of hate, nor are most of the conservative Republicans who have recently been working on his behalf; they are simply ambitious political figures. But in pursuit of these ambitions he and they have often seemed willing to work with, and accept the support of, those who are most extreme and unreasonable, those who very often are accomplished political haters. Hatreds against "the Kennedys" and those arising from the inevitable tensions arising from the unresolved civil-rights issue have been deliberately fanned—not only by Dixiecratic politicians, but on at least three major occasions within the past year by Goldwater-oriented Republican candidates for high office.

The climate of civility, as we can see so clearly now, has deteriorated seriously under the strain of a kind of politics which can only, and with the greatest charity, be called irresponsible in the extreme. Until November 22, this kind of campaign was spreading. It seemed to be producing significant results and thus whetted the appetites of certain politicians for more. Now all of this has been swept aside with the suddenness of an assassin's bullet. It is yet too early to say what permanent effect this tragedy will have upon the public consciousness. But surely it is strongly to be hoped that there will at last break forth a massive popular revulsion against political extremism of the sort which deals with firearms, horrendous and wholly fictitious conspiracies, groundless slanders of our fellow men and paranoid hatreds. If such a revulsion does emerge, it may well rub off on Senator Goldwater himself to a degree, not to mention the real ultras of left or right. Whatever the political fate of individuals may be, we can only hope that our political life henceforth, while vigorous and lusty as it should be, will remain within the bounds of reason and civility. Such would be a change of which John F. Kennedy would have approved.

In any event, it now seems that the party realignment which so recently seemed incipient has now been radically deflected from its course, at least for the balance of this decade. The South is less likely to desert Johnson than his predecessor, and it no longer seems as probable as it did yesterday that Goldwater will be permitted to lead the Republican party to disaster in the industrial Northeast. What seems in prospect now is a massive accentuation of political centrism and brokerage—more of the same only more so, so to speak. The long-range processes working for this realignment have not disappeared. But it has now been deferred indefinitely so far as we can tell; for the moment, at least, we can scarcely conceive of the form which it will take when it finally occurs.

It need hardly be repeated that all of the foregoing is at best highly speculative. We cannot know for some months to come what the new alignment of political forces will be. Finding our true bearings in the midst of this turmoil will not be an easy task, nor will it be the accomplishment of a day or a week. We have perhaps a better idea of what we have lost. John F. Kennedy left behind him much unfinished, urgently pressing work. He also left us a rich legacy. He showed us what it means for the whole political culture to have as a President a man of youth, vigor, intelligence, prudence and cultivation.

But he may perhaps be better understood if we turn not to modern but to antique models of excellence. For above all Mr. Kennedy seems to have possessed a quality which was prized most highly by the Greeks but is virtually unknown to the modern world, and most unusual in an American chief executive. President Kennedy possessed the virtue of *sophrosyne*—a quality for which there is no equivalent in English but which, roughly, is the antithesis of arrogance, vain conceit and hauteur. This virtue includes accepting the bounds which excellence lays down for human nature, restraining impulses to unrestricted freedom, to all excess, obeying the inner laws of harmony and proportion of one's own being. It may perhaps be summed up in the two renowned Greek axioms: "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess." Flowing from this extraordinary character was his prudence, a virtue which is not the product of weakness but of a judicious, disciplined use of very great powers.

Woodrow Wilson once commented, surveying the burdens of the Presidency, that it would soon be necessary to choose for it only "wise and prudent athletes—a small class." What more precise description have we of this man? What Horatio had said of Hamlet's father, the dead King of Denmark, we can truly say of our late President: "He was a man. Take him all in all/I shall not look upon his like again."

The Peace the Mind Turns To

Beneath devising, the mind pivots
upon silence, yearns toward the pivot,
not oblivion, which is the shadow
of silence, but that quiet point
whereon we turn, move and stay . . .
calm as a glass sea at evening,
alive as the robin's eye.

JACK MATTHEWS