Day 7: I was going to stop, but couldn’t pass this up
The Petraeus briefing: Biden’s embarrassment is not the whole story
“On Jan. 16, two days after a killer earthquake hit Haiti, a team of senior military officers from the U.S. Central Command (responsible for overseeing American security interests in the Middle East), arrived at the Pentagon to brief Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The team had been dispatched by CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus to underline his growing worries at the lack of progress in resolving the issue. The 33-slide, 45-minute PowerPoint briefing stunned Mullen. The briefers reported that there was a growing perception among Arab leaders that the U.S. was incapable of standing up to Israel, that CENTCOM’s mostly Arab constituency was losing faith in American promises, that Israeli intransigence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was jeopardizing U.S. standing in the region, and that Mitchell himself was (as a senior Pentagon officer later bluntly described it) “too old, too slow … and too late.”
Should we worry that the military is dabbling in foreign policy directly (not the first time, I know), or should we applaud their forthrightness in bringing home the bad news? (From Foreign Policy)
I don’t think there’s any objection to the military “dabbling” in foreign policy. But what’s a “dabble?” At what point are they trying to shape policy to suit the military establishment? If that point is reached, it’s certainly up to the White House or State to make absolutely certain they don’t get away with it unless, of course, they are trying to shape it in the larger interests of the US rather than the smaller interests of the military establishment and their friends in industry.
A lot depends, of course, on whether Petraeus was asked for his views, or whether he simply volunteered them unasked. In any case, his warning here reminds me of a communication sent by the British Admiralty to the Foreign Office in the late 1930s — a highly dangerous period — at a time when Britain was economically strapped and unable to come up with the cash to enlarge the Royal Navy. A reduction in the number of the nation’s enemies, said the Admiralty, can be as useful as the construction of more battleships.
But then Petraeus got where he is because he’s not afraid to buck the standard military bureacracy. See the very interesting talk given at West Point by William Deresciewicz “Solitude and Leadership,” in the new issue of the American Scholar.
http://www.theamericanscholar.org/solitude-and-leadership/
Thanks Nicholas for the cite. Observation about Petraeus appears half way down.
But you raise a good point, good for the U.S. or good for the military?
I think we need to see the 33-slide, 45-minute PowerPoint to assess the important concerns Nicholas raises.
Can you please provide a link, Margaret? :)
My security clearance doesn’t go that hi!
“America’s relationship with Israel is important, but not as important as the lives of American soldiers.”
I’m so tired of seeing the U.S. enabling expansion of Israeli settlements.
There’s nothing in Margaret’s post that does not make sense.
Israel has a right to exist — but not at the expense of our relations with other governments in the region.
When are we going to have the intestinal fortitude to tell this Israeli government to go take a flyin’ leap???
“…but not at the expense of our relations with other governments in the region.”
To include the Palestinians who want to negotiate in good faith with an intransigent Israeli government.
Not to mention other Arab states willing to help further peaceful resolution for all parties concerned.
I hear a few reports on this issue last week that left me very pessimistic. In particular, I have two questions/comments about which I would value knowing the thoughts of dotCommonwealers:
1) It was reported that Israel has twice offered the Palestinians a two state solution, one with most of East Jerusalem as the capital. Both offers were turned down by the Palestinians. Is this true?
2) I was left with the impression that the “right” of Palestinian return to land within Israel is the true roadblock and both sides seem equally intransigent on this one. Is this true?
All informed, and even semi-speculative, answers to these questions would be appreciated.
Re Joe Petit’s query no. 1: I don’t have the information you seek, but I do note that it is not sufficient to know whether Israel made a two-state offer. One would have to know the details of the offer. Also of importance are the circumstances in which the putative offer was made. Finally, even if one could say that the Palestinians rejected two past offers that were sensible, it does not follow that they are now at fault for the present impasse.
Surely that offer was made by Israel during the Clinton presidency? And Arafat’s declining the offer is thought to be what set the stage for the first intifada? That’s the history I’ve read, anyway.
Jim,
The report I heard said the offers were made by Ohlmert and Barak.
There are varying accounts of the summer 2000 peace negotiations convened by Bill Clinton.
Though Arafat was publicly blamed for their failure, Aaron David Miller, one of the U.S. negotiators, has written “In the summer of 2000 the chances that Arafat and Barak would reach an agreement to solve or end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were pretty close to zero.” Barak lost a vote of confidence in the Knesset while in the U.S. for the negotiations and was heading a minority government. Arafat according to Miller, “couldn’t say no to negotiations and keep Bill Clinton in his corner. At the same time he came neither to make sweeping concessions nor to negotiate in any meaningful sense of the word…. On the max side, he wasn’t going to settle for much short of June 4, 1967, and sovereignty over most of East Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif.” (I am not sure that was really on offer in 2000.) (Miller, “The Much too Promised Land, pp, 296-297.)
The talks between Olmert and Abbas: I’ve never seen anything official about what was on offer. The two seemed to manage to go on talking for a considerable period and too get along, but it was never clear that Olmert could deliver on any settlement that Abbas could accept.
A central issue here is whether the U.S. can ever broker a deal. Should we withdraw our support, recognize a Palestinian state, and join the EU and others in enforcing the 1967 border; allowing of course that the Israelis and Palestinians would have to resolve their differences under those constraints.
Thanks so much, Peggy, for staying with this. Please, please, don’t stop!
I am still interested in thoughts on the right of return, and here is why. I have not seen someone who is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause every actually comment on whether or not they think that a right of return should be recognized. If it is indeed a non-negotiable demand by the Palestinians, and a non-starter for the Israelies, then what? The suggestion that we just recognize a Palestinian state and the 1967 borders does not answer the question of the right of return. Would the Palestinians themselves accept such an action, given that it does not include a right of return?
Ah, that should read “ever actually comment” (sometimes I wish the thread gurus at dotComm would go in and make these corrections for us, at least on request!)…and the “someone” should be linked with a “she or he thinks” not a “they think.” Yeesh, I best not reread this anymore.
The right of return: my understanding is that this has been a negotiable. That a few Palestinians would be allowed to return and others would receive compensation. I have never seen spelled out how “few” and how much compensation. In my reading, the assumption seemed to be that compensation would come from an international fund of some as yet unknown source (U.S.? Eu? the quartet? others? all?). As you probably know, there is a long-standing historiographical argument about who fled? who was forced out? etc. Therefore, we can probably assume that the question of who is a refugee and a legitimate holder of the right of return is itself a source of future contention. I doubt Israel would welcome many returnees and some in the current political coalition have spoken of ejecting Arabs currently living in Israel proper.
The question about the right of return points to another “solution” of the conflict, one that has increasingly come to the fore, namely the one-state solution, i.e, the people now living between the sea and the Jordan comprising Israel, Gaza and the West Bank would become one state. Would it remain a Jewish state? Would it remain a democracy? Would it be a bi-national state, i.e., Jewish and Palestinian?
When people like Livni (the Kadema candidate in the last elections) point to one-state as the outcome if a settlement is not reached for a two-state solution, she is pointing to a possible outcome of the conflict, hence her favoring the two-state solution.
Lieberman the current foreign minister in the Netanyahu government during the campaign raised the threat of expelling Arabs now living in Israel and ensuring the Jewishness of Israel. To the original Zionists this would have been unacceptable (though this is what happened to some degree in the 1948 war–the source of the “right of return” issue). As Israel’s population has become more extreme politically, such proposals seem to get a more sympathetic hearing in the Israeli electorate.
Jimmy Carter was pilloried for using the word, “apartheid,” to describe the current divisions in which there is one state, Israel, which controls another nation/people in Gaza and the West Bank. But that is the situation in which Israel finds itself. We can argue about who’s fault it is–both Israelis and Palestinians to varying degrees. But that doesn’t resolve the conundrum in which both find themselves.
Israel’s ties to the United States (“the indispensable nation!”) not only support and protect it. Those ties have also allowed Israel to avoid facing it’s true existential situation: make peace or rule over a hostile population forever.
The 1948 UN General Assembly Right of Return resolution:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_194
I have visited Israel off and on since 1987. Carter was correct in using the term “apartheid.” I will go so far as to use the term Bantustan to describe how Israel has isolated Palestinians under the most deplorable conditions — and then gets unconsionably righteous when things go awry.