Will this be where Obama comes acropper?
March 3, 2009, 12:08 pm
Posted by Margaret O'Brien Steinfels
Bob Herbert raises some anxious and pointed questions about Afghanistan and the administration’s yet-to-be enunciated policy.
“We invaded Afghanistan more than seven years ago. We have not broken the back of Al Qaeda or the Taliban. We have not captured or killed Osama bin Laden. We don’t even have an escalation strategy, much less an exit strategy. An honest assessment of the situation, taking into account the woefully corrupt and ineffective Afghan government led by the hapless Hamid Karzai, would lead inexorably to such terms as fiasco and quagmire.
Instead of cutting our losses, we appear to be doubling down.”
Here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/opinion/03herbert.html?_r=1&ref=opinion
And an LBJ/ Vietnam comparison here:
In a recent “Newsweek,” Fareed Zakaria had an article stressing the need to be realistic about what can be accomplished in Afghanistan. I don’t know that I fully agree with Zakaria, and I think the invasion of Iraq caused us to take our eye off the ball in Afghanistan, but Zakaria makes some good points. There won’t be a strong sense of accomplishment, from the perspective of many Americans, when the U.S. finally leaves Afghanistan. Instead, according to Zakaria, the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on four primary tasks, each difficult in its own right, so that Afghanistan will be more stable when the eventual pullout takes place: (1) “Do counterinsurgency right”; (2) Strengthen the Afghan government”; (3) “Talk to the Taliban”; and (4) “Pressure Pakistan.” The penultimate and final paragraphs in the article:
“Afghanistan is a complex problem, and progress will be slow and limited. But we need to stabilize the situation, not magically transform one of the poorest, most war-torn countries in the world in the next few years. It will help immeasurably if we keep in mind the basic objective of U.S. policy there. ‘My own personal view is that our primary goal is to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and extremists to attack the United States and its allies,’ said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last week. That is an admirably clear statement.
It is not that we don’t have other goals—education, female literacy, centralized control of government services, drug eradication, liberal democracy. But many of them are objectives that will be realized over very long stretches of time, and should not be measured as part of military campaigns or political cycles. They are also goals that are not best achieved by military force. The U.S. Army is being asked to do enough as it is in Afghanistan. Helping it stay focused on a core mission is neither cramped nor defeatist. It is a realistic plan for success.”
Full article at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/182651/page/1
“Afghanistan is a complex problem, and progress will be slow and limited. But we need to stabilize the situation, not magically transform one of the poorest, most war-torn countries in the world in the next few years.”
Isn’t it a real question whether Afghanistan is a “country” in the sense of being a nation? Zakaria is right to see a complex problem, but part of that complexity seems to be that it is still a collection of tribal entities.
While Pakistan, one of the linch pins of our policy, is a nation, it suffers in some parts the same problems with tribal entities.
I found this analysis of the current situation there vis a vis Afghanistan and the Taliban illuminating:
http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/03/bhasin-pakistan-matryoshka-doll-of.html
Agree – in some sense, Afghanistan and its tribal history is not much different from Iraq – Kurd, Shia, Sunni and even added breakdowns between Sunni groups and between Shia groups Yet, the dictator ship of Hussein made it a nation on the surface. Afghanistan has even more tribal regions; less religion impact; and did have the brief nation experience of the Taliban (although how united they were is a question).
Some questions – in Iraq, it appears that changing tactics, aligning with the Awakening Councils & sheiks, plus the surge led to a degree of stabilization for a new government. Whether that works out has yet to be proved.
In Afghanistan, Obama/Gates seem to be proposing a different strategy given the difference in situation, context, and current history. From Obama’s Camp Lejeune speech:
“We have also taken into account the simple reality that America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities: we face the challenge of refocusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan; of relieving the burden on our military; and of rebuilding our struggling economy – and these are challenges that we will meet.”
“This reflects a fundamental truth: we can no longer deal with regional challenges in isolation – we need a smarter, more sustainable and comprehensive approach. That is why we are renewing our diplomacy, while relieving the burden on our military. That is why we are refocusing on al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan; developing a strategy to use all elements of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon; and actively seeking a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab world. And that is why we have named three of America’s most accomplished diplomats – George Mitchell, Dennis Ross and Richard Holbrooke – to support Secretary Clinton and me as we carry forward this agenda.”
There are many lessons to be learned from what we’ve experienced. We have learned that America must go to war with clearly defined goals, which is why I’ve ordered a review of our policy in Afghanistan. We have learned that we must always weigh the costs of action, and communicate those costs candidly to the American people, which is why I’ve put Iraq and Afghanistan into my budget. We have learned that in the 21st century, we must use all elements of American power to achieve our objectives, which is why I am committed to building our civilian national security capacity so that the burden is not continually pushed on to our military. We have learned that our political leaders must pursue the broad and bipartisan support that our national security policies depend upon, which is why I will consult with Congress and in carrying out my plans. And we have learned the importance of working closely with friends and allies, which is why we are launching a new era of engagement in the world.
The starting point for our policies must always be the safety of the American people.
We talk about nation-building – not sure that is even the direction for Afghanistan – rather, our first goal is to insure American safety and that may mean depriving terrorists of safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan; need to be creative in terms of working with the tribal realities; need to reach out to the Taliban; need to stabilize Pakistan; need to get NATO and the UN involved; need to shift from war to infrastructure tribe by tribe.
The analysis is very illuminating. Thanks for the link.
Hillary Clinton and Richard Holbrooke really have their work cut out for them. The Dayton Peace Accords that Holbrooke helped broker to end the Bosnian civil war were just a warm up for the huge task ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Not only has Pakistan begun accommodation efforts with the Taliban in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, but the U.S. is dealing with two weak heads of state in Presidents Zardari and Karzai. It’s plain the military calls the shots in Pakistan, and many in the military, especially its intelligence apparatus, are sympathetic to the Taliban. I hope Holbrooke will be able to develop strong ties to the Pakistani military in his special envoy role. His job will likely be even harder in Afghanistan, where the country is in reality run by provincial and tribal warlords.
Add al-Qaeda to the mix, which as the article indicates has grander global visions than do the Taliban, and there is a deadly concoction of instability in the region. And today’s “nested doll of terrorism”–the blatant daylight attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team–demonstrates that al-Qaeda (the supected perpetrator of the attack) has not backed off its primary aim of transforming nuclear-armed Pakistan into a militant Islamic state.
I think I’m going to stop by a church later today and say a Rosary. (Seriously.)
I have been listening to Now You Know Media’s “Encountering Islam” presented by Akbar Ahmed, Ph.D., Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies and Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington D.C.
The professor makes a telling point. He claims that the US will continue to fail throughout the Muslim world so long as our politicians think that we can foster Western-style nation states in those countries. Islam is basically played out within tribal structures. So much of what we think negative about Islamic practice is, in reality, a result of tribal cultures (i.e., female circumcision) as opposed to Islamic law.
The current dedacle in Israel/Palestine is a clear result of tribalism gone mad.
Until the Western world comes to understand and appreciate this fact, all of our efforts are doomed to continuing failure. I’m afraid that Obama has surrounded himself with the same mindset that Bush appointees had, but, hopefully, not so impervious to learning and change of mind.
Perhaps this is obvious to everyone, but it seems that the legacy of the Durand line, the very artificial British drawn border between Afghanistan and Pakistan that cuts the Pashtun tribes in half, will continue to haunt us. Does anyone know of anyone talking about a way to fix this problem?
It does seem we are sweeping up after the British Imperial Adventure, doesn’t it? India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, the old Ottoman Empire….
The “very artificial” Durand Line was drawn at a time of stalemate in the colonial sparring in the region between Britain and Czarist Russia. The rivalry became known as the “Great Game,” an especially inapt name when the consequences of the Durand Line demarcation are viewed from the 21st century,
What a conincidence: I just saw this by David Ignatius reading from a one hundred year old letter on British policy making in the Northwest Frontier area of Pakistan, the precursor perhaps to the Durand Line:
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/david_ignatius/2009/03/david_ignatius_march_2_0918.html
The relevant lines begin at 1:50…
While I concur(easily) that we shouldn’t attempt “nation building,” the outcome of our attempts there in the long rum seem far to fuzzy to me.
Short term issues such as the election in Afghanistan (now almost certainly in August, while Kharzi’s term ends in a couple of montsh) and the whole complexity of dealing with the Pakistani military which talks out of both sides) needs to be confronted.
I am not sure what it means to confront the Pakistani military. At one time, they seemed to be in charage; now it’s not so clear. After yesterday’s attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team, you have to wonder if anyone is in charge.
Even the Pakistanis don’t seem to know what’s going on, as this morning’s op-ed piece, “Lahore Murder Myster” amply demonstrates:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/opinion/04sethi.html?_r=1&ref=opinion
Thought I would add one more comment. One of the most interesting history profs that I had in graduate school at DePaul University started a lecture one day by stating: “WWII was not over; the goals of the Allied Powers were never attained or completed.” He then made us review the goals – for example, self-determination for nations, peoples, ethnic groups; the end of colonialism. He then related this to Vietnam – in 1948-1950, if the US had changed course and supported the OSS groups of WWII, the US would have supported the national parties of Ho Chi Minh. Unfortunately, the fall of China and the “domino theory” (now discredited even by McNamara) made the US reject the self-determination WWII goals and support the re-introduction of French colonialism (sometimes justified because of fears that France was facing its own communist parties and needed a colonial empire). It was a continuation of foreign policy that discounted the difficult task of listening and learning about tribes, religious groups, regional powers, ethnic territories vs. the much simpler task of allowing colonial powers to draw nation lines severing hundreds of years of tribal tradition, history, respect, integrity.
That is why I am hopeful that the new administration will not repeat the same mistakes of Eisenhower/LBJ (Kennedy falls into a special category given his untimely death); will not adopt its own “domino theory” now called “war against terrorism” and simplistically label all tribes, ethnic groups, religions e.g. Moslem as anti-democratic or terrorists. Would suggest that we regain the notion of self-determination.
Yes, we have inherited a lot of debris from history. Mentioning the reassertion of French colonialism after WWII put me in mind of the great wave of opposition to colonialism in France during the 30s when many strong and compelling reasons were advanced to get out of Indochina for one. Unfortunately, the left got wiped out in the war, and the initiative seemed to have died.
But you might be interested in a short series Dissent magazine had in its last issue; the series is “Getting Out.”
Here’s the one on the British getting out of India (apropos of our discussion on Pakistan above). But they also have France and Algeria, and so on.
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1327
Thank you for the comments and link – I was not aware of this magazine. The article is excellent……a good example of the remaining issues around ethno-religious break is the continuing saga of Kashmir.
The British removal from India and “washing their hands of the sub-continent” parallels their same departure from Palestine and the resultant vacuum and wars that continue today.
The writer does mention an interesting point that continues to impact US foreign policy in this region – the influence or non-influence of Russia. Many will argue in favor of continued involvement to offset the “imagined or real” threat that Russia could become an important partner to Pakistan (they were at one time -shortlived); Afghanistan (doubt this given their recent history); India (they were military trading partners for a while) and Iran (Russia currently provides nuclear information and weapons). But, the threat of Russia can be likened to the thrreat of China in the Vietnam time period.