Odd couple: Augustine & Blagojevich

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Stanley Fish, the New York Times’ online “Think Again” columnist, is always good for sparking debate, and today’s column is no different: An argument for seating Illinois’ disputed senatorial appointee, Roland Burris, based on St. Augustine’s response to the Donatist controversy:

This debate was about the status of churchmen who had cooperated with the emperor Diocletian during the period when he was actively persecuting Christians. The Donatists argued that those who had betrayed their faith under pressure and then returned to the fold when the persecutions were over had lost the authority to perform their priestly offices, including the offices of administering the sacraments and making ecclesiastical appointments. In their view, priestly authority was a function of personal virtue, and when a new bishop was consecrated by someone they considered tainted, they rejected him and consecrated another.

In opposition, St. Augustine (rejecting the position that the church should be made up only of saints) contended that priestly authority derived from the institution of the Church and ultimately from its head, Jesus Christ. Whatever infirmities a man may have (and as fallen creatures, Augustine observes, we all have them) are submerged in the office he holds. It is the office that speaks, appoints and consecrates. Its legitimacy does not vary with personal qualities of the imperfect human being who is the temporary custodian of a power that at once exceeds and transforms him.

Fish argues that this reasoning (and he cites other examples) means the Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich, who has been indicted for trying to sell the senate seat he appointed Burris to (apparently gratis), should be able to make the appointment and Burris should be seated. (Whether Burris’ standing measures up is another question.) He concludes:

The (perhaps paradoxical) truth is that while governing has or should have a moral purpose — to safeguard and advance the health and prosperity of the polity — it is not a moral practice. That is, one engages in it not by applying moral principles but by applying legal principles. Senator Reid and his colleagues in the Democratic party seem finally to have figured that out, which is why, in the absence of any more bombshell revelations, Roland Burris will be seated as the junior senator from Illinois. 

Over at the CT blog, where I saw this, Stan Guthrie argues that Saint Paul would likely agree with Fish.

In any case, could be a good one for debate at the Chicago meeting of Christians ethicists that Cathleen Kaveny is attending this weekend.

UPDATE: Blago has been impeached. Now goes to State Senate for trial. Don’t know how long that would take, or whether it would affect Burris, or Fish’s (Augustine’s?) argument.

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Comments

  1. I’m inclined to agree with Fish’s conclusion, but I do have some reservations about the completeness of his rationale. Legal principles always do have their place, but so does practical wisdom in their application.
    In the Burris matter, I think that it has been quite appropriate to keep the political heat on the governor and to proceed with less than full speed. Doing so, in my view, makes the outcome, whatever it is, more likely to meet with wide public acceptance, even if it is grudging acceptance.

  2. Most intriguing question. Most important here is the axion: “S/he who distiguishes well, knows well. I will not go into the many non-sequitors that Fish has in his article, but focus on Augustine. I maintain that Augustine left a terrible legacy to the Christian faithful. Not because he was not right that the office is not invalidated by sin. Rather, many of these people who abandoned their faith should not have been restored that easily. Thus he really put a stamp on mediocrity in the clergy and Christianity. Validity became more important than righteous living, dogma became more important than the Way.

    As far as the quote from Paul is concerned, this is a source of other countless abuses. The conclusion of church officials has been that if the kind is wrong he still must be obeyed. This has resulted in terrible abuses of obedience where obedience became more important than virtue. One does not have to search for many examples to prove the point.

    Yes the Donatists were wrong about validity. But they were right about those returning had to prove themselves first. The Augustine principle is so dangerous. We see this in that it took the Boston Globe to force Law to resign and that no hierarch was going to do it. They hardly criticized him

    Big lesson here.

  3. Fish’s argument is characteristically clever and just plausible enough to be dangerous. There seem to me to be at least two important differences between the case of the Donatists and the case of Burris and Blagojevich. First, the Donatist rebellion threatened the principle of apostolic succession. It’s not clear what fundamental principle of our democracy would be threatened by not seating Burris. (There is obviously a proceduralist argument for seating him, but there is also a procedure — and a precedent — for not seating him.) Second, it isn’t clear, at least to me, how the principle of ex opere operato applies to a republic. It is supposed to be the power of the Holy Spirit that allows a properly ordained priest to administer the sacraments, not his personal virtue. Is there anything like the Holy Spirit to appeal to in the case of a corrupt politician? The will of the people? I’m not sure even the most confident democrat, or the most democratic Catholic, would be happy with that analogy. And in order to make sense of Augustine’s argument there is something else we need to remember about the priests and bishops rejected by the Donatists: They were repentent. Blagojevich seems to have no regrets.

  4. I have to laugh, because in a much simpler way and without any thought of Augustine, the idea had crossed my mind that Blagojevich is like a priest who is personally corrupt, but who nevertheless retains the “powers” to do his official duties. The only legitimate question in the Burris matter is whether he did anything improper to get the appointment that would lead to him being discredited down the road. It seems a no-brainer to me. As I said earlier, what was outrageous was the state attorney general trying to get the state supreme court to oust Blagojevich as “disabled.”

  5. “It’s not clear what fundamental principle of our democracy would be threatened by not seating Burris.”

    That we’re a nation of laws, not men. Thank goodness, in this case – I don’t want Harry Reid’s whims determining matters of great moment.

    (Disclaimer: generally I try to write inclusively, but in this case, the phrase is so well-established, and the alternatives limp so badly, that I felt I had no choice)

  6. I like Matt Boudway’s critique (and his impression of Fish’s columns strikes me as about right), and I would defend him on his assertion that democracy would not be impeded if Burris weren’t seated–even though I think he will be, and probably should be. I mean, look at the other folks who may be getting appointed, or comedians getting elected by a handful of disputed ballots.

    But this op-ed in the NYT seems to be a very good argument about the dubious constituionality of all gubernatorial appointments–one man, one vote, indeed:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/opinion/07geoghegan.html

  7. Before we flip off ‘Landslide” Franken, it would have been interesting to be a fly on the wall with those 5 guys going over disputed ballots in the Land of the L:akes.
    The imperfections of our political system are not easily solved by pointing up the problematics, even analogies to Augustine, Paul or whoever.

  8. David G., I can’t begin to express my shock that we’d blithely ignore a Constitutional requirement, especially considering our slavish devotion to the parts about only Congress can declare war, the President and Vice President can’t be from the same state, etc.

  9. Stanley Fish’s motto ought to be, “The spirit killeth but the text giveth life.”

  10. I don’t think that Augustine’s position is accurately described by Fish. Augustine didn’t think that it is the “office” that speaks or consecrates. He thought that it was Christ who was the principal actor in the sacraments, as in the famous statement: “If Peter baptizes, it is Christ who baptizes; if Paul baptizes, it is Christ who baptizes; if Judas baptizes, it is Christ who baptizes.” And with regard to speaking, he said that if the preacher preaches the truth, it is Christ who preaches.”

  11. Let me stay out of the Fish-Augustine matter. But David Gibson’s comment about “other folks who may be getting appointed, or comedians getting elected by a handful of disputed ballots” is astonishingly silly. One may rightly question procedural requirements, but one cannot sensibly just decide to disregard them at will and still claim to have a government based on established law and not on whim.

  12. Bernard Dauenhauer, thanks for your kindly comments. It’s always nice to be able to astonish, though I don’t know how high the bar is in your case.

    In any event, let me explain: Firstly, I was being a bit sardonic (apologies for my lack of deadly earnestness) in that all of the tsurris about Burris can become amusing when we step back and look at the handful of other senate follies, either the angling for appointments (Kennedy or Cuomo?!) or the Minnesota recount after a three-way race in which a bad comedian may defeat a bad incumbent by a vanishingly small percentage of disputed ballots. Of course I do think Franken should be declared the winner. Laws are laws, as you say, and this appears the closest to certainty as we’ll get (certainly closer than Florida 2000). This all doesn’t undermine democracy, but in a way reinforces it through a seriousness about the process and laws–even if we can never be statistically sure if more voters chose Franken than Coleman. It also reminds us how human are candidates, and we voters–and silly, at times. (Even bloggers.) And has been pointed out (esp in the very good Peter Baker piece in the NYT) appointees and “celeb” senators can turn out to make very good public servants. Democracy in America seems able to overcome much, or transform challenges into victories of a sort. So bring on Caroline!

    True, I do not think that the Burris case is life-or-death for American democracy even though, as the author argued in the op-ed, the rule of law would–contra your argument–be better followed by calling a special election. Yes, I do think that a governor appointing a senator at his discretion is not a great example of democracy in action, and I suggest that considering a special election, as per the U.S. Constitution is not “astonishingly silly” or even a “whim,” but actually the government based on established law, as you would like. Yet governors have appointed senators this way for decades and our democracy hasn’t ended; indeed, it has improved in many respects, esp in terms of participation.

    Also, I am trying to reconcile your comments in the first post saying that the Illinois legislature should play a go-slow game on Burris with your latest shock at any thought of following a different procedure. What changed your mind?

  13. David Gibson, no I haven’t changed my mind. Here’s what I’m trying to say.
    First, Gov. Blagojavich has legal authority to appoint any legally qualified person to fill the seat to which he has appointed Mr. Burris. But, because of the charges on which he has been indicted, any appointment he maakes will be under a cloud of suspicion. Sens. Reid, Durbin, etc., have reason to express public reluctance to seat someone who is under such a cloud. This has to do with preserving public confidence in the integrity of the
    senate. But they do not have the legal right absolutely to refuse to seat Mr. Burris. So, after expressing their concern and effectively reassuring the public that they will be on the lookout for any impropriety in the relationship between the governor and Mr. Burris, their duty is to respect the governor’s legal authority.
    Finally, when I characterized your comment as “astonishingly silly,” I was out of line. My characterization was inappropriate. I hope that you will accept my apology.

  14. Thanks for the clarification, and I think we’re not actually too different in our positions.

    Peace.

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