Intrinsic Evil, Prudential Judgment and Sundry Matters
One of the things that has frustrated me this election season is the way that two concepts from Catholic moral theology have been thrown around in ways that distort the way they actually operate in the tradition. I checked my perceptions with a couple of theologians whose judgment I trust, but I will leave them nameless so they are not held responsible for my errors in interpretation.
The first is the concept of “intrinsic evil.” In their Faithful Citizenship statement, the USCCB defined “intrinsic evils” as actions that are “so deeply flawed that they are always opposed to the authentic good of persons.” Strictly speaking, the statement is correct. However, I am finding that the statement is sometimes being read to imply that “intrinsic” evils are of greater moral weight than those that are not. This is not always the case.
There is a strong tradition in Catholic moral theology that evaluates the morality of acts according to a threefold test that looks at 1) the act itself, 2) the intent of the actor; and 3) the circumstances surrounding the act. All three of these things must be good (or at least neutral) for the act to be morally licit.
Traditionally, to say that something is “intrinsically” evil is to say that it is evil at the level of the act. It is “objectively” wrong, regardless of the intent of the actor or the circumstances. Such acts can never be morally licit. This does not mean, however, that such acts are always greater evils than acts that are evil by dint of intent or circumstance.
Consider an example from sexual ethics. The act of masturbation has traditionally been considered “intrinsically” evil. It is a sexual act that can never be ordered toward the goods that human sexuality is ordered to support, i.e. marriage and children. Adultery, by contrast, is-at the level of the act-an act of coitus between a man and a woman. The act itself is good or at least neutral. It is the intent of the parties and the circumstance of their being married to other people that renders the act morally wrong. While there is a strand of the Catholic tradition that holds that “sins against nature” are of special moral gravity, I would be hard pressed to find a theologian–or a confessor–these days who would hold that masturbation is a worse sin than adultery. I certainly don’t plan to try the argument out with my wife.
The second concept that is getting a lot of use lately is the concept of “prudential judgment.” In their recent pastoral letter, Bishops Kevin Farrell of Dallas and Kevin Vann of Ft. Worth write that “issues of prudential judgment are not morally equivalent to issues involving intrinsic evils.” Similarly, George Weigel argues in the most recent issue of Newsweek that “pro-life, pro-Obama Catholics are thus putting the full weigh of their moral argument on contingent prudential judgments that, by definition, cannot bear that weight.”
I believe that these distinguished gentlemen are mistaken in their understanding of the concept of prudential judgment. They seem to imply that if one uses prudential judgment to discern that a given action (or inaction) is evil, that action should be given less moral weight than an act where such judgment is not required.
This is incorrect for two reasons. The first reason is-as we saw above-that the fact that an action is “intrinsically” evil does not mean that it is a worse evil than one that is not.
Secondly, once an individual moral agent–through the use of prudential judgment–comes to the conclusion that a given act is evil, then the agent must treat it as evil and act accordingly. If I conclude that the War in Iraq was an unjust war, then I need to treat it as such when I am making my moral decision-making. I do not get to say “Well, I believe that the War in Iraq is unjust, but its injustice is mitigated because I had to employ prudential judgment to determine this.” The fact that I needed to use prudential judgment may make me less sure about my conclusion, but if I am sure, then that conclusion is binding on my conscience.
None of this is to say that the evils outlined by the bishops-abortion, euthanasia, torture, etc.-are not very grave evils. But their gravity is more a function of their violation of justice than of the fact that they are intrinsic evils and therefore allegedly don’t require the use of prudential judgment. To be honest, I’m not sure the latter would ever be true because I almost always need to employ that judgment to determine whether my act is, in fact, an act of euthanasia or torture.
In retrospect, I think it would have been better had the U.S. bishops simply asserted that, with respect to our political choices, some evils are particularly grave because (pick one or all): 1) they attack fundamental principles of justice; 2) they are practiced or tolerated on a very wide scale; 3) they are practiced or protected by the state, and thus the question of who controls the apparatus of the state becomes particularly important.
That’s probably enough for now. For obvious reason, I’d be particularly interested in Cathy’s feedback, but everyone is of course welcome to comment.
Check out Cathy’s artucle in the new America (on line today) for a nunaced discussion of this – of course, within the casuistic moral tradition.
You certainly are hitting on something serious, Peter. The best thing that could be said about casuistry is that it helped people who were accused in a condemnatory theology. That preeminent model of moral, theology, The Sermon on the Mounts, has been deemed merely advisory. That should tell us something about a field which seems to be overwhelmed by preoccupation with sexual behavior.
Let me return here to the matter of prudential judgments. I understand them to be, in the Aristotelian sense, judgments of practical wisdom. This is how they work. Or so I think.
Consider abortion. Let’s agree that the act of aborting a human being is an intrinsic evil. This means that neither I nor anyone can ever rightly participate in an abortion. There is no set of circumstances that would permit me rightly to do so. There is no need for prudential judgment about this.
Furthermore, let’s agree that I ought to OPPOSE all abortions because they are all intrinsically evil. But now the matter is complicated. How ought I (not you, nor Jack nor Jill) act in opposition to them. Obviously, I don’t have to make my every action one that is in opposition to abortion. The issue now becomes when, where, and/or how do I oppose them. To answer this question rightly requires practical wisdom or prudential judgment. This judgment has to weigh a host of contingent and changing circumstances. For example, what are my capacities, other responsibilities, etc., what are the prospects that what I do in opposition to abortion will have any efficacy? How will what I do today to oppose abortion affect my ability to oppose abortion tomorrow?
Etc., Etc.
Obviously, exercising practical wisdom never yields a definitive conclusion. I could always think about more relevant things or think longer, etc. But the urgency of situations often requires me to bring my reflections to a conclusion. That’s the best I can do. It’s all anyone can do. It would be a violation of practical wisdom to refuse to face up to these constraints.
My conclusions are not irrelevant to your deliberations. We do learn for one another how our actions regularly turn out. So, practical wisdom does call for us to consider how things have fared for other people faced with comparable situations. But I can’t rightly just follow you, using your judgment instead of exercising my own.
So, bottom line, prudence is what tailors the obligation of a general norm (here, oppose all abortions) to me in my present predicament of having to determine what to do next, namely explicitly aim act against abortion or do something else, perhaps related to abortion, but perhaps not, leaving until another day the discharging of my obligation to oppose abortion.
If this is an accurate account of how prudence works, then it’s clear that different people will rightly reach different conclusions about when and how to fulfill their obligations to oppose abortions.
The application of all this to the business of voting in the upcoming presidential election is obvious.
I should have added that the prudent person will look for competent advisers in matters that are especially important or complex. But he or she will not simply let the “expert” make the decision for him or her. Nor will the prudent expert not attempt to impose a decision.
Thanks Peter-all discussion of this is good.
More generally, I think a MacIntyrean analysis of what happened to the technical terms of Catholic theology would be good.
The other term, in addition to prudential reasoning, is cooperation with evil. Its roots are in the Latin manuals of moral theology, not in prophetic discourse.
The term casuitical has entered the conversation. I think it characteristic of the comments looking for a way, not to justify abortion, but to justify support of a politics that will permit [bez. increase] it. [All unchecked evil increases].
I shall go back to my copy of Pascal’s PROVINCIAL LETTERS and consider his study of confessors who looked for ways to justify the king’s misbehavior.
The notion that an intrinsic evil is always worse than an evil that can only be recognized by an act of prudential judgment leads to the following absurd conclusion:
Since it requires an act of prudential judgment to determine whether a particular war is just, Hitler’s decision to launch World War II was an error in prudential judgment only — an extrinsic but not intrinsic evil. A law that banned all abortions except for cases of rape and incest would be an intrinsic evil, however, because abortion is always and everywhere wrong. Therefore, the law that bans all abortions except in cases of rape and incest is a worse evil than World War II. Or, to put it the same context as Wiegel seems to be considering, it would be more important to close the gap this imperfect law than to avoid World War II.
Obiously, the gravity of an evil is not determined solely by whether the evil is intrinsic to the act or dependent on the intent of actor and/or circumstances surrounding the act.
I guess the question for us Catholic voters boils down to this: What sort of evil is it, if it is one, for me to vote for a politician who does not advocate a total legal ban on all elective abortions?
It seems the abortion issue on many fronts is getting down to the strictly legal question. The traditional pro-life movement says that one cannot be “against abortion” and also against a blanket legal ban. But more and more people, I sense, are recognizing that we can believe in the fundamental sacredness of human life while believing a legal ban on abortion to be not prudent nor practically possible nor even morally desirable, all things considered.
The terms of this issue seem to be morphing after years of passionate argument and legal developments–and it is probably all to the good, though neither side of the argument thus far will be comfortable with the development. Maybe democracy is working; maybe the holy spirit is working.