Life at Fertilization in Mississippi?
Mississippi votes today on an inititiative that would recognize life “at the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the equivalent thereof.” The sweeping measure seems to pass Catholic muster, since it would ban abortion in cases of rape, incest, or to protect the health of the mother. “Collateral damage” of the measure would include banning certain types of birth control, (notably the pill and the IUD,) stem cell research, IVF, and emergency birth control for rape victims (and others.)
ABC’s report is here. (A confusing point for me–the report says that Mitt Romney supports a Constitutional amendment defining personhood at conception, not fertilization, so is different from this bill. Really? Or is there some confusion here between conception, fertilization and implantation? Romney seems–it’s unclear to me–to oppose creating embryos for research, but has supported the use of “excess” embryos for that purpose.)
The initiative is polling at basically a dead heat, 44%-45%. Both parties’ gubernatorial candidates have endorsed the measure.
The measure is extreme enough that Bishop Joseph Latino of Jackson has written a letter taking no position for or against it, voicing concerns about “unintended consequences.” The initiative, if it passes, seems unlikely to pass judicial review.
Among the issues here is the distinction between the “let’s reduce the incidence of abortion , since it’s unlikely we’ll get it re-criminalized in the US” folks (and their potential for common cause with the “safe, legal and rare” crowd) and the “we must strive for absolute legal prohibition” people. Many staunch pro-lifers, (including Bp. Latino,) imply that the latter approach is harmful to the cause of eliminating abortion. James Bopp, Jr., general counsel for National Right to Life, told the New York TImes:
From the standpoint of protecting unborn lives it’s utterly futile, and it has the grave risk that if it did get to the Supreme Court, the court would write an even more extreme abortion policy.
But isn’t this law exactly what would be meant by respecting the embryo “as a person” from conception, as magisterial teaching on abortion states?
Or is this a situation in which the magisterium might argue against laws like this on grounds of toleration, a stance in which one allows an evil to continue because effectively barring it would cause greater harm to the common good? Classically, Augustine argued for toleration of prostitution in his port city of Hippo because he feared for the safety of other women at the hands of randy sailors if prostitution were banned. Aquinas concurred, citing Augustine in his argument in favor of tolerating religious rites of non-believers.
But…Catholic teaching on matters of public policy is that civil law is always to be framed in light of the common good. So if not legislating Catholic teaching on abortion is better for the common good than legislating it would be…or is this simply a matter of political prudence?
Good point and question, Lisa. Agree that the common good wins out. Goes along with the “old” approach that passing a law that is unobserved or violated by more than half the citizens is considered a bad law. Think Prohibition. There are also all of the complex issues around conception, personhood, life – someone such as Curran would add that science and therefore theology do not have certitude around these issues and thus, bishops should be cautious about proclaiming or ruling as if they have “certitude.”
Here in Michigan where many of us bone-headedly voted for a constitutional amendment allowing medical marijuana (we thought it would only be used for the terminally ill, but suddenly many of us were faced with classrooms of doped up college students who got someone to write them a scrip to treat their PMS with dope), I’d say that Mississippi will be embroiled in a lot of litigation if this bill passes.
What, for instance, will doctors be expected to do in the case of ectopic pregnancies, for instance?
The Church allows for the removal of diseased or damaged organs in life-threatening situations, and if these organs contain an embryo or fetus, this is allowed.
Moreover, Mississippi allows the death penalty. Will taking the life of a fertilized egg now be a capital offense?
And then there’ll be the constitutional challenges …
It’s hard for me to believe the state of Mississippi really wants to spend its time and money on this type of thing.
Sorry, didn’t finish this point:
The Church allows for the removal of diseased or damaged organs in life-threatening situations, and if these organs contain an embryo or fetus, this is allowed. Will Mississippi law make such allowances?
I do so hope this amendment passes.
The first thing that comes to mind is all the signs in restaurants and other public places (in New York, at least) saying: “Occupancy by more than X persons is dangerous and unlawful.”
Lisa, thanks for that link to the Jackson, MS bishop’s letter. It strikes me as a model of good reasoning.
It’s worth noting that the church, in its own moral teaching, doesn’t really use the concept of personhood in defending the right to life; rather, it teaches the sanctity of *human life* from conception to natural death.
“It’s worth noting that the church [sic], in its own moral teaching, doesn’t really use the concept of personhood in defending the right to life; rather, it teaches the sanctity of human life from conception to natural death.” (Jim Pauwels)
On the contrary, the Catholic Church emphatically asserts the following:
“Since it must be treated from conception as a person, the embryo must be defended in its integrity, cared for, and healed, as far as possible, like any other human being.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, section 2274)
Moreover, the preceding section of the catechism commits the Church to the position that the law must criminalize abortion to safeguard the concepts of equality before the law and human and civil rights.
Jim P . ==
The classic Catholic definition of “person”, was invented by Boethius, a 6th centuryRoman consul and philosopher, and Christian martyr. (He knew some Aristotle.) It’s was a highly useful definition, and it was adopted by the medieval philosopher-theologians, including Aquinas. The definition is “individual substance of a rational nature”
.
This definition, of course, covers God and angels too, which was no doubt part of its usefulness to the scholastics and their Catholic heirs.
Note: that definition does not *define* a human person because it does not include “animal”. Aristotle’s classic definition of man (human person is “rational animal” because body is also part of our substance (our basic being which can be perfected by various properties and other ontic embellishments).
Another semantic complication is that the word “person” in contemporary English refers to the same beings as “human person” does. In other words “person” today refers to people only, unless maybe you’re a Catholic theologian, and for them, as for the medievals, persons would include angels and God.
For the medievals and many later Christian theologians an organism is not a person until it has a soul. The soul is the spiritual, rational part of man’s substance. To be spiritual is not to have extension. Extension is what you study in geometry — the spatial, measurable stuff. So angels and God are non-spatial rational substances.
hese days some philosophers use the word “rational” to refer *only* to man’s intellect. Others use “soul” to mean “consciousness”, but they rarely define either word.
If I’m not mistaken, common law has some definition(s) of “person”, but I don’t know what it is.
Maybe you’re thinking of JP II’s use of the word “person”. He doesn’t always stick to the classic definitions. And the more’s the pity.
Fortunately, the inititiative failed.
What is a person? To base personhood on the having of a ratioanl soul means that people who don’t believe in God and people who do believe in God but who don’t accept Aristotle’s theory about souls will come up with other definitions. I don’t doubt there are many who might consider some animals as persons and perhaps in the future, some machines (AIs) as persons too. So much science fiction about this :) I remember an epsiode of Star Trek Voyager in whicu a hologram was granted personhood.
I’m with the ontic embellishments.
Thinking that the personhood amendment would be completely futile given the current legal climate is a very different thing from arguing against it on grounds of “toleration.”
Thinking that the personhood amendment would be completely futile given the current legal climate is a very different thing from arguing against it on grounds of “toleration.”
Studebaker,
I always raise this question, yet never get an answer that satisfies me. What about Jews who do not believe personhood begins at conception? Should personhood be established by law as beginning at fertilization, would Jewish women with life threatening pregnancies be prohibited from having an abortion because a majority established the Catholic criterion for when life begins as conception? Or would the usual exceptions most people (even most pro-life politicians) are willing to make on abortion bans (rape, incest, life of the mother) be permitted and some rationale worked out as to why it is acceptable to kill an innocent (unborn) person under these circumstances?
The Mississippi effort may (or may not) have been improvident given the current political and legal climate, but if “personhood” eventually comes to be equated with conception, either through the political or judicial process (the latter having resulted in the Roe/Doe state of affairs in place today), it won’t be because it is the Catholic or the Jewish criterion for when life begins that carries the day. It will be because political and/or judicial majorities decided that the human dignity of the unborn must be morally recognized and legally protected from the time of conception.
Great news!
Despite its feudal/plantation culture, Mississippi voters have rejected this gross intrusion into reproductive rights of women. Who would have thought Mississippi women and families have embraced a modern understanding of the rights to privacy?
Actually in a twisted sort of way, I was looking forward to the debates about what would be the appropriate criminal punishment for women who have abortions and their doctors – because contraception and termination of pregnancy would have to have been defined as a ‘murder.” Lynching could make a comeback.
Regardless of the merits of, or problems with the Mississippi proposal, no matter how you slice/dice it, abortion is still murder.
It is interesting how pro-choice folks say things like they want to keep abortion legal but “rare”. Why “rare”? If abortion is not bad, why should it be rare?
Therein lies the hitch of course; abortion is bad, and it is bad because it is murder.
Studebaker,
Exactly. (And apologies if I was unclear.) Do we *ever* want magisterial teaching on this question inscribed into civil law, or would we immediately be in a situation in which toleration would be the better course? This could become excruciating if stem cell therapies involving cloning become common. Mere political expediency is a different question.
And yes, we’d run roughshod over other traditions’ (Jews, most Protestants, some Muslims, et al.) notions of personhood and the human rights of pregnant women if we did so.
To clarify–there’s no ambiguity here about magisterial teaching on the early embryo. But would legislating the fullness of Catholic teaching on this question meet the tradition’s requirements that civil law be ordered to the common good? In some cases, making sure civil law upholds the common good would seem to trump religious liberty, as it would, e.g., if a religion supported polygamy or another harmful practice. But arguments must be made that make sense to people of good will, and we haven’t managed to convince the broader populace (including all those Protestants, Jews and Muslims of good will, who seem divided themselves,) that our stance on personhood imputed at conception is the right one.
The measure went down resoundingly, 58%-42%, a stunning drop from the support it garnered earlier. (I wonder if either of the gubernatorial candidates are abashed at their support for this?) Supporters said of course the measure wouldn’t affect the legality of some birth control methods or IVF, but, rationally, of course it would have.
Stephen O’Brien – certainly you’re right to cite that passage, and it does gainsay my comment. Nevertheless, because of widely varying notions of what constitutes personhood, the church is better-advised to, and often does, use formulations that emphasize *human beings* rather than persons. If you read the passage I’ve pasted below, I hope it will shed light on this concern for you.
Ann, thanks for that overview of classical and medieval notions of personhood. Wikipedia helpfully summarizes some newer and more divergent philosophical views on personhood, which in my opinion should raise concerns about insisting too strongly that only *persons* are entitled to legal protection. Here is a snippet:
[Begin quoted passage]
In philosophy, the word “person” may refer to various concepts. According to the “naturalist” epistemological tradition, from Descartes through Locke and Hume, the term may designate any human (or non-human) agent which: (1) possesses continuous consciousness over time; and (2) who is therefore capable of framing representations about the world, formulating plans and acting on them.[5]
Others have proposed different concepts, including Charles Taylor and Harry G. Frankfurt.
According to Taylor, the problem with the naturalist view is that it depends solely on a “performance criterion” to determine what is an agent. Thus, other things (e.g. machines or animals) that exhibit “similarly complex adaptive behaviour” could not be distinguished from persons. Instead, Taylor proposes a significance-based view of personhood:
“What is crucial about agents is that things matter to them. We thus cannot simply identify agents by a performance criterion, nor assimilate animals to machines… [likewise] there are matters of significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, and have no analogue with animals.[6]”
The philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt writes that, “What philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person in not actually analysis of that concept at all.” He suggests that the concept of a person is intimately connected to free will, and describes the structure of human volition according to first- and second-order desires:
“Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, [humans] may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call “first-order desires” or “desires of the first order,” which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.[7]”
According to Nikolas Kompridis, there might also be an intersubjective, or interpersonal, basis to personhood:
“What if personal identity is constituted in, and sustained through, our relations with others, such that were we to erase our relations with our significant others we would also erase the conditions of our self-intelligibility? As it turns out, this erasure… is precisely what is experimentally dramatized in the “science fiction” film, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, a far more philosophically sophisticated meditation on personal identity than is found in most of the contemporary literature on the topic.”[8]
Other philosophers have defined persons in different ways. Boethius gives the definition of “person” as “an individual substance of a rational nature” (“Naturæ rationalis individua substantia”).[1] Peter Singer defines a “person” as being a conscious, thinking being, which knows that it is a person (self-awareness).[9]
Philosopher Thomas I. White argues that the criteria for a person are as follows: (1) is alive, (2) is aware, (3) feels positive and negative sensations, (4) has emotions, (5) has a sense of self, (6) controls its own behaviour, (7) recognises other persons and treats them appropriately, and (8) has a variety of sophisticated cognitive abilities. While many of White’s criteria are somewhat anthropocentric, some animals such as dolphins would still be considered persons.[10] Some animal rights groups have also championed recognition for animals as “persons”.
[End quote]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person
It seems clear that infants still in the womb, particularly in early stages of development, are excluded from some of these definitions of what constitutes a person. So would some severely developmentally disabled humans (striving not to use any variation of the word “person” in my comment :-)), some who have experienced significant brain injury, and perhaps some Alzheimer’s patients.
Ken,
Quadruple by-pass surgery is bad, compared to preventing it with careful attention to cardiovascular health. I want it to be rare. I DEFINITELY want it available to those who need it. In Catholic medical ethics, not everything that’s bad is to be eliminated. But everything that’s bad can’t be intended as an end itself, and has to be judged in light of proportionate benefit to the patient. So–no “for fun” quadruple by-pass, let’s all do what we can to avoid the surgeon’s knife, and let’s thank God we have surgeons ready to go if we need them.
That’s how you might want a bad thing to be licit but rare. It may or may not apply to abortion, but it applies to all sorts of other things.
It is interesting how pro-choice folks say things like they want to keep abortion legal but “rare”. Why “rare”? If abortion is not bad, why should it be rare?
Ken,
It bewilders me that so many people say this kind of thing. The underlying thought seems to be that if a living thing is not a person, it has no moral worth at all. If abortion is not the murder of a person, then it’s trivial. But many people, probably the vast majority, are against unnecessary killing of just about any living thing, and many people are also against causing unnecessary suffering of living things. Respect for live does not have to be limited to respect for persons. So even aside from the fact that abortions are surgery and it makes sense to minimize surgery, there are humane reasons for not wanting to kill a human embryo even if it isn’t a person.
Crystal –
You’re defining “person” as one who acts irrationally. But the Aristotelian definition means only that persons have the *capacity* to act rationally, not that they do so always.
William Collier –
You seem to think that at conception the “human” zygote which is not yet a person has the human, personal right-to-life that human persons do,
How can a non-person have the rights of a person? This is like saying that because monkeys are like human persons they also have a right to life, and that puts you in the camp of Peter Singer who thinks dolphins and higher primates have a human’s right to life. (Singer’s arguments, as I’ve mentioned before, are quite similar to classic Catholic ones).
“To clarify–there’s no ambiguity here about magisterial teaching on the early embryo.”
Lisa,
Not so. JP II’s clear statement to that effect is not consistent with the historical teaching of the Church on the matter, as that Wolter-Sullivan article shows clearly.
“Quadruple by-pass surgery is bad, compared to preventing it with careful attention to cardiovascular health.”
This analogy is off-base. Surgery is “bad” only in the sense that you’ll miss work, have to recover, etc. It’s intent to keep a heart beating.
No one who wants abortion to be rare thinks it’s bad primarily in that same sense. They think it’s bad because it stops a beating heart.
Ann–
I’m saying that a fertilized egg that results from the union of a human egg and a human sperm has human dignity simply because it is a member of the species and genus Homo sapiens. The dignity cannot be conferred or taken away by anyone else; it can only be recognized and respected by others. You had human dignity at the moment of your conception, I had the same dignity, and so did everyone else who is reading this blog. Human dignity is a lowest common denominator that binds all of us. Was there ever a time in our lives–even for a split second–when any of us lacked human dignity and were therefore not entitled to both moral and legal respect? I’m not willing to concede that as to myself or as to any other human being who has ever lived or who will ever live.
@ Ken:
You need to get yourself to a OB-GYN rotation.
Medically speaking, abortion is never a “good outcome.” But sadly, it is sometimes the “best” outcome for women with at-risk pregnancies.
This is why everyone wants to make abortion “rare.” Why the Catholic bishops don’t see this is beyond reason.
If as you say, abortion is “murder,” then to whom would you apply capital punishment? Women with at-risk pregnancies? Doctors and nurses who perform the procedures? Perhaps the rapist, maybe the incestuous, father of the fetus?
If a woman has an ectopic pregnancy – where there is no chance of fetus viability – and she has an abortion, should we capitally execute this woman?
Since the Catholic Church has done such a good job of discouraging the use of contraceptives (I’m being cynical), should we now allow the states to deny and/or regulate the use of contraceptives counter to the Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut? Government should now supervise and scrutinize the sexual lives of millions of Americans?
Once you start down this road, Ken, it only gets more and more morally treacherous.
JIm P. ==
If you look at the natauralist definition of “person” you’ll see that it is quite consistent with the classic one, though not nearly as full a definition of what we are. Taylor’s criticism is well taken, I think.
Frankfurt’s objection is very well taken. I didn’t go into the full meaning of “rationality’ for the medievals, but it includes free will (plus a few other little technicalities). The will, as much as the intellect, is not a material sort of reality. Acts of the will cannot be sensed by any sort of sensory power, and the reason is because acts of the will are also non-spatial. If you looked for the color, flavor, texture, etc. of a will act, you wouldn’t find it because will-acts are spiritual.
The “inter-subjective” definition is particularly lame. If you were the last man on Earth would you stop being Jim P.? (That’s for starters.) That definition is the definition of David Hume and the Buddhists. For Hume, there is no one continuing element in the thing we call a person which is continuous throughout a human life. Therefore, the person is a process. Of course, Hume is quite right, given where he starts from — he thinks that the only sort of knowledge is empirical knowledge, that is, sensory knowledge. But the Aristotelians argue that there must be some reason why all our sensory experiences hang together and a reason why all human beings turn out to be *human* beings and not rhinoceroses or robins or, for that matter, a honky-tonk piano.
In other words, animals which start out having certain elements in their make-up always turn out to have the same sorts of elements at the end, e.g., baby caterpillars always end up having wings and not horns or flippers for swimming. Aristotle argues that there must be something present during the whole process of the life of the animal which directs its changes towards what it is at the end. Many philosophers today will agree with him that far, but they maintain that it is because of the DNA in the original cell that things of one kind end up as things of the same kind But that theory won’t hold water either.
As to Singer’s definition, if I have to be aware of myself to be me, then when I sleep I stop being me, and you can murder me? Actually, he might be getting at something important, but I don’t think it’s a definition.
I thought this thread was whether the Mississippi initiative was an overreach.
I think it was and the vote confirmed that.
If the Gospel of Life is to move forward through legalities, there needs to be brofd concomitant persuasion.
William Collier –
Note: when you and the biologists (and JP II) say that the not-yet-person (the zygote) is members of “the human species” you are using that phrase in the purely biological sense. Biological “species” refer *only* to material realities, only to purely material beings. In other words, their meaning of “species” is narrower than Aristotle’s. So when a biologist talks about a “human” animal his meaning of “human” is quite different from that of an Aristotelian philosopher. (And never forget: not only did Aristotle invent biology — he also invented logic.)
Crystal –
My apologies. Youd didn’t say “irrationally”. My answer should read:
‘You’re defining “person” as one who acts RATIONALLY. But the Aristotelian definition means only that persons have the *capacity* to act rationally, not that they do so always.’
William C. –
You are using “human dignity” in two very different senses — or are you saying that the zygote has the same degree of dignity that a human person has?
If your answer is no, then you don’t have a reason for saying it should not be killed. If your answer is yes, then how do you justify saying what is less than a human person has the same rights as a human person?
(This particular issue has so many semantic problems they boggle the mind.)
I saw a tail-end of an interview with Gov. Barbour of Mississippi last night. Rachel Madow asked him what about ectopic pregnancies and the like. He admitted that he has serious concerns about that and similar cases, but he voted for it anyway.
The governor’s problem is similar to the Catholic bishops’. They make exceptions and yet they keep saying that there the general principle *always* holds. Madness.
As to Singer’s definition, if I have to be aware of myself to be me, then when I sleep I stop being me, and you can murder me? Actually, he might be getting at something important, but I don’t think it’s a definition.
Ann,
First, while asleep, we don’t stop being aware. We respond to stimuli that are important to us. A mother, for example, may sleep soundly through a thunder storm and yet be awakened instantly by a sound from the baby’s room. So I don’t think sleep counts as a state in which one is unaware of oneself. I have experienced general anesthesia a few times, and it seems to me all awareness might reasonably said to be absent. But does it make sense to say a capacity or capability is gone when not actively being used? Was Fred Astaire not a dancer when he was not dancing and not a singer when he was not singing?
The difference between an early embryo and an anesthetized person is that the early embryo may have the potential for self-awareness, but an anesthetized person has been self-aware and will be self-aware when the anesthesia wears off, and has the capacity for self-awareness while anesthetized even though not using it at the time.
Jim J – You are citing exception after exceptional exception; that is hardly a defense of 50 million abortions since Roe v Wade. There is no defense of such an abomination.
Following Rome is morally treacherous? I do not think so.
If Catholics would follow the magisterium of the Church, perhaps listen to the Popes by actually taking time to read Humanae Vitae and Theology of the Body and give those works the sort of thoughtful consideration they deserve, and try to do their best regard all of this, things will work out fine.
It is my understanding that the Catholic Magisterium does not have a defined position on exactly when a fertilised egg becomes a peron. We don’t know for sure exactly when God infuses the soul, and given the rather high death rate of fertilized eggs in the early stages of life, there are sound reasons to think it may be some time after conception.
Because the Church doesn’t know for sure, we err on the side of caution, and in favor of the potentiality of the conceived human life, by defending human life from the moment of conception even though we are not sure whether or not a person exists at that early stage.
God Bless
The question of “personhood” was covered in Commonweal back in 1994:
“ In its report, the (NIH) panel acknowledges that the very young embryo merits respect as a developing form of human life. But a cancer is a developing form of human life and merits no respect at all. What commands our respect and protection is not human life, but living human beings. In a bold stroke, the panel finally turns from word-craft to embrace an eccentric theory devised by its theologian member. No “human being”, we are told, qualifies for moral recognition and social protection as a “person” just by being a human being. To accredit humans as “persons,” we who award that status have to calculate, not simply who or what “they” are, but how much of a burden they are going to be, and whether our best interests are served by declaring them protectable. With this “theology” no more bioethic-speak will be needed. “We” balance the fact that “they” – these human beings – are really too little to know or to feel what “we” are doing to “them”, against the important genetic discoveries they might make possible for us. At this point the calculus become easy: on balance, we have “moral respect” for them, but more “moral respect” for what we can gain from them. The precise issue to be decided this (1994) December at the NIH, of course, is not whether making human hamsters is moral or legal. The NIH is equally incompetent in both those disciplines. They will decide whether to fund such research. Ant they will probably say yes. But I offer a modest proposal. This panel report will not abate the widespread distrust in what the NIH, in its conflict of interest, calls moral inquiry. I propose that in order to sidestep even the suspicion of exploitation, all scientists funded to beget and use embryonic human beings for research voluntarily agree to use only embryos whom they themselves have sired or conceived, in vivo or in vitro, with their mate as co-parent – all of this done, it is understood, with “moral respect, profound respect,” but not “undue respect.” To a mistrustful public, to an embarrassed NIH, even to their other children, these truth-seeking researchers can then take deserved pride in the fact that they will not have asked of others what they themselves were not ready to give. “
Ishmael Law (a pseudonymous academic who has served as a consultant to the NIH), article “A Modest Proposal”, Commonweal, 12/2/94.
“But does it make sense to say a capacity or capability is gone when not actively being used? Was Fred Astaire not a dancer when he was not dancing and not a singer when he was not singing?”
I agree that capacities remain when we’re not conscious. My reason: because when we wake up we find they’re still there. And our experience with other *non-sick, not-injured, not-dead* people is such that it seems always to hold. But those are very different sorts of states of affairs from the state of zygotes and old, obviously dying people.
Just look at the Schiavo case. It actually brings up a lot of moral problems because such cases don’t present enough data to make assured decisions.
So I grant you that our decisions can’t always be assured because of lack of information. That applies also to well people when they’re sleeping. We don’t know if they are in fact dead unless we can see them breathing, and we take that as strong evidence that they’re still alive
P. S. Aquinas says somewhere that we die in stages. In other words, there could be times in the dying process when, say, the person is no longer rational but is still an animal. That might be what happens in cases such as the Schiavo case.
To both Lisa and David:
“And yes, we’d run roughshod over other traditions’ (Jews, most Protestants, some Muslims, et al.) notions of personhood and the human rights of pregnant women if we did so.”
That point is meritless, as it is impossible to imagine an abortion law that doesn’t enshrine somebody’s tradition and “run roughshod” over someone else’s.
“I’m saying that a fertilized egg that results from the union of a human egg and a human sperm has human dignity simply because it is a member of the species and genus Homo sapiens ”
William C. –
This repeats what you said before. How do you counter my arguments against it?
“How can a non-person have the rights of a person?”
By passing a law saying it’s a person.
And I’m not trying to be flip. Changing legal definitions have a far-reaching impact on public policy and the penal code. Look at the current debate, not exactly raging but certainly spirited, in how we define “poverty.” The current system looks at income. Some are suggesting the regional cost of living and benefits be factored in. The Heritage Foundation points out that the American poor typically have items that would be considered luxuries in the Third World (TVs, refrigerators, coffee makers, and the like).
Who is determined “poor” will determine who gets social welfare benefits, when, and for how long. How we define “personhood” will likewise determine what protections a “person” has and what penalties for harming that “person” will be.
(I use quotation marks around “person” only because I do not pretend to know when life begins to be a “person.”)
“Because the Church doesn’t know for sure, we err on the side of caution, and in favor of the potentiality of the conceived human life, ”
Chris Sullivan –
While there are some doubtful cases in which we must give the being the benefit of the doubt, there are other cases in which this is not true,
For instance, IF YOU HAVE REASON TO THINK that the animal moving in the forest is a human being, then you do not shoot at it. But you must have EVIDENCE that it isn’t a person. On the other hand, IF YOU HAVE REASON TO THINK that it is NOT a person, then you may shoot.
In the case of the zygote during the first two weeks there is strong evidece that it is NOT a persson. First, there is the twinning and tripletting, etc, of one cell. Second, the zygote shows no evidence of being capable of actually doing specifically human things — e.g., there is no evidence of brain activiey. In fact, there cannot be such evidence for the simple reason that the zygote doesn’t have a brain. The brain stem starts to form only about a week or so after conception. Cast logically:
A being cannot be a human person unless it has a brain.
Early zygotes have no brains.
Therefore, early zygotes are not human persons.
So what about the not-so-early embryo? I dont’ think we have enough data yet to know when the embryo is thinking rationally. So that question can’t be answered surely.
““How can a non-person have the rights of a person?”
By passing a law saying it’s a person.”
Jean –
If the Louisiana legislature passed a law saying “All persons named “Ann Olivier” are Rockefellers and rich”, would I thereby *actually* be a rich Rockefeller?
You cannot change a reality into something else by describing it differently. Let’s call trying to do so the semantic fallacy.
That point is meritless, as it is impossible to imagine an abortion law that doesn’t enshrine somebody’s tradition and “run roughshod” over someone else’s.
Studebaker,
We already have laws that don’t run roughshod over anyone’s tradition. Nobody who is opposed to abortion is forced to have one, and no one who has a religious tradition that allows abortion is prevented from having one. The law has carved out a “space” where those who morally oppose abortions don’t have to have them, participate in them, or pay for them, but others are not deprived of their freedom.
A being cannot be a human person unless it has a brain.
Ann,
I don’t see that a brain is necessary to be a human person. The souls of the dead are human persons and they don’t have brains.
In the zygote case, I think we are talking of a biologically human being who has the potential to develop fully into a human person.
I’d hesitate to require thinking before we admit someone is still a human person. That would seem to break down in cases like severe brain injuries, late Alzheimers, comas etc.
God Bless
One thing I don’t understand – if the bad thing about abortion is that it’s the killing of a person, why is captal punishment ok? This seems to say that what’s bad about abortion is not the killing of a person, but the killing of an “innocent” person.
So this whole argument ins’t really all about personhood or about the sacredness of all human life, it’s all about wanting to assume the power to make distinctions of worth and to decide life or death? BTW, Edward Fesser has a quite chilling article defending capital punishment …. http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/09/4033
You cannot change a reality into something else by describing it differently. Let’s call trying to do so the semantic fallacy.
Ann,
I don’t know about that. A corporation is a legal person, with many of the same rights as a person. It is a legal person because the law says it is. If a carefully worded “personhood amendment” to the constitution were passed, I don’t see why personhood couldn’t be defined as starting at conception. It would be a radical change in the law, but I don’t think defining a fertilized egg as a person falls into the same category as someone being rich. Being rich is en empirical matter, and calling a poor person rich doesn’t make it so. But being a person is a matter of definition (and philosophy). When corporations are deemed to be legal persons, it’s a matter of definition and legislative action. And of course it would also be possible, just to be on the cautious side, to say that from conception to birth, the developing child must be treated legally as if it were a person.
There is a piece by Charles Camosy over on Catholic Moral Theology titled What Passing Prenatal Personhood Doesn’t Mean that is worth reading, and he has a video from a television show in which Peter Singer discusses the personhood amendment. Interestingly, Singer says somewhat in passing that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided. But Singer, of course, doesn’t feel that infants a few months old qualify as persons. As I understood him, he has no problem at all with laws saying they should be treated as persons, so I think in principle he would not have anything against laws saying a fertilized egg should be treated as a person. The pro-choice woman in the video pretty much dominates the discussion, and she is very articulate, but I would have liked to hear more from Peter Singer.
I don’t see that a brain is necessary to be a human person. The souls of the dead are human persons and they don’t have brains.
Chris Sullivan,
Surely you are not prepared to argue that in front of the Supreme Court. I don’t think it even holds up under scrutiny as a religious assertion. We have discussed this before and not come to any consensus, but I don’t think the idea of a disembodied human soul makes much sense, common as the idea is in everyday, nonacademic religious conversation.
I’d hesitate to require thinking before we admit someone is still a human person. That would seem to break down in cases like severe brain injuries, late Alzheimers, comas etc.
Then what about brain death? If persons don’t need brains to be persons, must a person who is brain dead but on life support be treated like a living person?
Ann–
Legal “person” and philosophical “person” are not necessarily the same thing. A corporation is a “person” under the law because, as Jean said in another context about legal definitions, policy decisions were made to extend the legal rights of “persons” to corporations.
In addition, I don’t think I’m making a circular argument, though I do think that you and I have different perspectives on “person” to some degree. I’m sure you’ve forgotten more philosophy than I’ll ever know, but I’ll give my argument one more try.
A fertilized egg is an immature member of the human species. It’s not a potential human being, it’s an actual human being, and the fertilized egg has a biological status as a human being. My contention is that the fertilized egg’s biological classification as an organism belonging to Homo sapiens is sufficient to accord it intrinsic human dignity and to serve as the basis for recognizing its moral worth. Intrinsic human dignity doesn’t turn on whether the fertilized egg has some value beyond being a member of the human family–e.g., whether it is has consciousness, ability to feel pain, or some other sort of scientifically detectable property. Rather, I think the fertilized egg has intrinsic human dignity simply because it is the kind of thing it is–again, an immature (albeit, very immature) organism that is a member of the human species. Furthermore, I think that this inherent human dignity is the non-religious foundation for how we value human beings. We care more about the moral worth of human beings than we do about kudzu, for example, because we ascribe more intrinsic dignity to a human being than we do to a plant.
I just want to note that I agree entirely with William Collier.
You make good points William. It seems that for some, the “where to draw the line”, part of this is difficult.
Obviously some folks (mainly the pro-choice crowd) are convinced that before a particular point in its development, the fetus is not human and therefore does not merit any sort of moral and legal protection.
Other folks are convinced that since the fetus will not grow to be anything but a human i.e., it will not grow to be a cancer, a duck, or a horse or a house plant, that it should be respected as human and protected as such from the moment of conception. This is the position that most Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and many Protestants hold.
I obviously agree with the Catholic view that a fetus is human from the moment of conception, that life is precious and should be valued and protected from the moment of conception until natural death. It is best if we humans do not try to play God; best to refrain from playing “where to draw the line” games with human life. It is not our role and in any case, we have never been good at that game.
We do better, when we try to accept God’s will and try our best to cooperate with Him.
Chris –
See the article by Joseph F. Donceel, SJ, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization”, Theol. Studies, March, 1970, pp. 75-105. It addresses the question directly.
“The main philosophical principles are as follows. The soul is the substantial form of the man. A substantial form can exist only in matter capable of receiving it. In the case of man’s soul this means: the human soul can exist only in a highly organized body .” [Donceel references Aquinas, Summa Gentiles, 2,89.}
Since a body without a brain is not a highly organized human body, the soul cannot be present in it. That would be analogous to saying that the soul of an ape could exist in the egg of a sparrow.
Donceel goes into a lot more detail.
Also see William Shannon and Allan B. Wolter, ofm on “The Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo” in Theological Studies, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 603-626. (Wolter was one of the greatest medieval scholars of the twentieth century.)
Any tCatholic moral theologian who claims to be defending a “Catholic” view on this subject really must take the arguments presented in these two articles most seriously. The arguments are found in Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas. And No, the arguments are NOT dependent on medieval biology. On the contrary. So for a Catholic theologian to ignore these giants and lesser thinkers is really unprofessional. But I’ve seen it done.
“I don’t see that a brain is necessary to be a human person. The souls of the dead are human persons and they don’t have brains.”
Chris –
True. The souls of the dead are incomplete persons, no having bodies. This is why the medievals argued for the resurrection of the body.
CHRIS says also: “In the zygote case, I think we are talking of a biologically human being who has the potential to develop fully into a human person.”
ANN replies: How can a less than human person have a literal potential to become a human person? That’s like saying a parrot has the potential to become an opera singer. It doesn’t. It is like a human person in some of it’s vocalizations, but it doesn’t have the potential to sing intelligently.
CHRIS also says: “I’d hesitate to require thinking before we admit someone is still a human person. That would seem to break down in cases like severe brain injuries, late Alzheimers, comas etc.”
ANN replies: True, they do not exhibit all human activities. But we know that their bodies are *defective* in some way, which leaves open the possibility that the defect might be corrected and the person could resume performing the activities of persons. They too are worthy of the benefit of the doubt.
There are other difficult questions like these which have arisen due to modern biology/medicine/psychology. Eventually, as we have more scientific data we’ll be able to resolve them one way or another.
Notice this: these ethical arguments have biological, psychological, and metaphysical components. As we know more of the science we can have a better ethical system. On the other hand, if you ignore the philosophical premises of the middle ages you will have ignored some of the best thinking in history on the subject. They were vastly more competent philosophers than the biologists and psychologists of today. In fact, I don’t know of any first rate biological authority who is also a metaphysician. There are some physicists who are, but I don’t know of any biologists.
” A corporation is a legal person, with many of the same rights as a person. It is a legal person because the law says it is.”
DAVID N.–
No, a coporation is not a legal person, not in the same sense as the Boethian one. And why you change the meanings of terms in an argument, the argument is invalid. This is Freshman logic.
DAVID also says: “A corporation is a legal person, with many of the same rights as a person. It is a legal person because the law says it is.”
ANN: Same problem. The legal meaning of person is NOT that of Boeethius. It were, then every corporation can literally think as you do, choose as you do, make friends as you do, etc. And if it were a person in the Boethian sense it too would have ALL of the inalienble rights that we do.
This nonsense of treating corporations as persons (as define by Boethius) and using the new word as if it had the Boethian meaning is the source of the nonsense that lets corporations contribute all they want to election campaigns. The law, as you might have heard, is an ass.
One thing that philosophers of language have known all the way back to Aristotle is that words have two components — the physical sign and its meaning. When you change a meaning then you have a different word, and when you use it with that new meaning it isn’t the same word as the original one.
Ann is a good logician and semantician.
However, legislators are not, and if they can’t transmogrify matter, they can do the next best thing, which is to endow it with legal status. (Wasn’t it Caligula who made his horse a Roman senator?)
Occasionally, their wrong-headedness is good-hearted. More than occasionally, it’s eye-wash intended to make them look virtuous and moral before a public by passing vague legislation that may have “unintended consequences.” (One wishes Bishop Latino had fleshed this out a bit more.)
Charity requires me not to assume I can look into the hearts of Mississippi legislators.
William C. –
I agree with you wholeheartedly that a corporation person is not a person in the same sense.
BILL also says; ” A fertilized egg is an immature member of the human species. It’s not a potential human”
ANN replies: this is the point at issue, so you can’t rely on it to prove your point. That would be begging the question.
BILL also says: “My contention is that the fertilized egg’s biological classification as an organism belonging to Homo sapiens is sufficient to accord it intrinsic human dignity and to serve as the basis for recognizing its moral worth.”
ANN replies: (This contradicts your first sentence. Which one do you mean?
Given your next senence as true, the “humanity” of a non-personal zygote is a lesser humanity than that of the real persons. What is your basis for saying we should treat these two inequalities as if they were the equal? Also, sorry, but that ape is not a member of MY family. (YOu’ve switched the meaning of “human” again.)
Thanks, Jean. (My poor ole brain is about to break.)
“We already have laws that don’t run roughshod over anyone’s tradition. ”
Completely wrong. Would it be OK with you if torturing puppies to death were officially protected by constitutional law? After all, you don’t have to torture a puppy yourself.
” — a brain is necessary to be a human person. The souls of the dead are human persons and they don’t have brains.”
The first statement is based on empirical observation and reason.
The second statement is based on faith which may or may not be shared by others.
You’ll never convince believers in #1 that #2 is based on empirical observation and reason.
‘Would it be OK with you if torturing puppies to death were officially protected by constitutional law? After all, you don’t have to torture a puppy yourself.”
Would it be OK with you if taking a human life by capital punishment were officially protected by constitutional law? After all, you don’t have to take a life by capital punishment yourself.
Would it be OK with you if ending a marriage in divorce were officially protected by constitutional law? After all, you don’t have to end your marriage in divorce yourself.
I could go on even more —–
I’m sure you could go on, but can you state the point that you’re trying to make?
What I’m trying to say is this: for society to protect something that you believe is a grave moral wrong is itself a violation of your beliefs. That may be OK or it may not be OK — we ignore people’s beliefs all the time. But that’s my very point: it’s stupid to say that banning abortion would “run roughshod” over people’s beliefs, while ignoring the fact that protecting abortion also runs roughshod over other people’s beliefs.
In connection with misinformation regarding Mississippi’s Amendment 26, I recommend Matt Yonke’s article entitled “How ‘Fertilized Eggs’ Tanked the Mississippi Personhood Bid”:
http://prolifeaction.org/hotline/2011/initiative26/
Can anyone more knowledgeable in this area comment on the implications of the law which allows a person who murders a pregnant mother to be charged for double homicide? Does this mean that effectively the mother’s will legally determines personhood prior to the third trimester?
Christopher C.–
Here’s a link to a state-by-state summary of the fetal homicide laws compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures. As you’ll see, some the laws in some states are premised on recognition that the fetus also has legal rights, and the laws in other states are premised on injury to the mother without recognition that the fetus has any legal rights.
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14386
Ann–
I’ll be back to you, offline if that is o.k. with you. A busy day for me today, and this thread seems as if it has just about run its course.
Please allow me to shed some light on Initiative 26 and why it was likely defeated. I live in Mississippi, in the capital area, am a Catholic, and having worked many years for the state, understand the legislative process and culture.
Initiative 26 was defeated because of the vagueness of the proposal and its inclusion in the constitution. As Bishop Latino pointed out in his letter, person is mentioned in statute 9,400 times, thus potentially requiring legislation and/or interpretation of the term “person” in 9,400 instances.
Despite an earlier, derogatory comment about Mississippi being “a feudal/plantation culture”, this initiative was not defeated because we “have rejected this gross intrusion into reproductive rights of women.” A large majority of Mississippians are pro-life, believe that life begins at conception, and believe that this is our reproductive right. Many people who voted against 26 did so because of its possible implications with IVF, ectopic pregnancies, or other situations in which the mother’s life was at risk and there was no possibility of saving the unborn child.
With the initiative’s vagueness, voters were not willing to leave it up to legislators define the intent of “person” as it would relate to each statute in which the word was contained.
As noted in the article, the Catholic Bishops took no position on 26 because of its potential ramifications in the abortion battle at the federal level. The Episcopal and Methodist Bishops, several Baptist churches and non-denominational churches, and several Jewish congregations took excpetion to the initiative because of its potential intrusion into moral choices people must make when faced with difficult pregnancies.
I assure you, the majority of opposition to 26 had very little to do with legalized abortion and much to do with vague language and unknown ramifications in the medical arena.
A more effective approach would have been to work on legislation directly affecting the statutes that deal with abortion, rather than trying to create a “catch-all” solution by amending the constitution.
Michelle–
I hope others are still checking this thread so that they can also read your thoughtful post.
I think Michelle’s post is very helpful in that it points out that legislation, however right-hearted, may not reflect the Catholic position on an issue, abortion in this case. (Would that Michigan residents had had the same wisdom as Mississippians when they voted in their medical marijuana amendment.)
In my view, this is the danger of trying to legislate Catholic moral doctrine into law: you don’t end up with Catholic moral doctrine. You end up with either vague and sweeping language that may favor fetal and embryonic life over that of pregnant women. Or you end up with some very specific bill that metes out punishments that run contrary to Church teaching.
Limiting abortions incrementally and placing some obstacles in obtaining abortions, such as informed consent and waiting periods, strikes me as a better way to go about this. Perhaps the next step is to require that two doctors agree that there is some compelling medical reason for an abortion to be performed, which would could raise awareness of the kinds of Catch-22s pregnant women sometimes face.