Church and State, Revisited
In today’s Boston Globe, David Mednicoff points out that secular governments in the Middle East seem to have a tough time of it compared to Islamic states, both in terms of stability, but also, he argues, openness.
Money quote:
This rising tide of mass protests against Arab secular strongmen urges us to think again about the role of Islam and government. Decades of Western policy have pushed Middle Eastern governments toward secular reforms. But a more nuanced view of the region — one that values authenticity as much as Western dogma — suggests something different. If we are concerned about stability, balance, even openness, it may be Arab Islamic governments that offer a better route to those goals.
Yes, caveats and exceptions abound. (Consider, e.g., the role of women in conservative monarchies like Saudi Arabia. Stable, OK, but good?) But he raises an intriguing question.
I am reminded also of the ringing “The Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church,” condemned as an error by Pope Pius IX in his famous Syllabus. Indeed, the notion of religious freedom as basic to human dignity is a recent idea in Catholicism. Toleration of other religions had been advised by Aquinas, but only if some good comes from permitting them, (he advised toleration of Judaism because he thought it foreshadowed Christianity,) or if a greater harm might ensue by quashing them.
And the ominous presence of Islamist extremists waiting in the wings in the destabilized countries raises the same question: should the US be supporting moderate Islamists rather than Western-style secular states? And what would the religious right in the US say?
It’s essential to point out that the U.S. has not supported all secular Western-style governments in the Middle East — only those that served our interests. (Like, ahem, Saddam Hussein.) One could argue that the crushing of secular left-wing movements and governments — with the support of the U.S. — is what provided the opportunity for radical Islamism. (Ex., Iran in 1953. Having ousted Mohammed Mosaddegh, we ended up with the Ayatollah Khomeini.) As an opposition to post-colonial monarchies and authoritarian regimes, Islamists, extremist or moderate, have filled a political and ideological space once taken up by the Middle Eastern left. On the whole, the U.S. got the governments it paid (and killed) for in its effort to win the Cold War.
Who the hell cares what the religious right thinks? They already have the blood of slain Ugandan gay rights activist David Kato on their hands.
The underlying assumption about these questions is that US is a force for good and has the welfare of the people of these countries in mind.
It’s a real shame that throughout the Cold War and beyond, nations seeking liberation (oftentimes explicit about their inspiration from the American Revolution) have suffered not only a lack of support from the US, but murderous antagonism and/or war.
Think Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Think military-industrial comples.
Think American “exceptionalism” in its most odious extreme.
What we have sown we are about to reap — in spades.
I fear the Egyptians will not appreciate our government backing Mubarak for all those years.
Church/State Factoid: Egypt as far as I can tell has allowed the Coptic church to go about its religious mission; the recent attack on a Coptic Chruch would seem to have been a rare exception to religious tolerance, at least of the Copts, and I would bet the next government, however Islamist it might be, will go right on allowing Coptic worship.
This is a fascinating area. It is difficult for the West to understand Muslim countries as even terms like “secular” have different meanings. And as the article briefly alludes to (although it would be interesting to get into greater depth), the understanding of the relationship between faith and civil life is far different from the other two monotheistic religions:
1. Moses was not allowed to enter the promised land.
2. Jesus stated that his kingdom was not of this world and died as a criminal.
But Islam is different
3. Mohammed gained political power as he progressively grew as a prophet. Intertwined in the fabric of revelation is political, social and cultural laws and codes. From what I understand Mohammed was asked to mediate disputes in Medina which is where many of the teachings surrounding Islam.
Furthermore, the notion of the nation state is a colonial imposition on a culture and I am not sure the extent to which people existentially identify with the country over and above their faith.
The conflict or relationship with modernity is something that Islam, like Christianity, will have to confront.
I think that Pius XII was in fact in error with the syllabus and the Second Vatican Council got it right from both a traditional and modern point of view. The USA model, at least as far as it concerns the practice of religion, will, I believe, prevail in the end. I think the Vatican is slowly wrapping its head around it.
I also think that the US gov’t should probably cut its losses (toss Mubarak) and get on the right side of history. If there are free and fair elections, from what I understand a “moderate” government that is more religious than this one, would be elected. But the fear of the Muslim Brotherhood is unfounded and there may be a bit of Jewish paranoia underneath it. In the end, they would not get a majority but would have influence – not unlike the tea party.
The best outcome is free and fair elections, bring in outside observers and just trust the process. It will be messy sure – democracy always is but it will prevail as the model as it is the most empowering of all systems to date. I might be a bit of neo-con in that regard but that is my sense of things.
Remember how in the 1980s US Gov.was convinced that Central Americans were about to invade Texas.
Pray for Egyptian peaceful transition..
It seems to me that what is crucial in Egypt, and in the other Muslim countries for that matter, is what the military thinks, where its loyalties lie, what its vision of a “state” must include. As Muslims do they see political power as necesarily knit tight to the ruler(s)? If so, what sort of ruler(s) is the military committed to, if any in particular?
Muhammed himself was a general who ultimately engaged in battle and in conquoring at least some of those who opposed him, and the history of Islam, unfortunately, has too often been a history of a religious-military-cultural-ethnic force which vaued honogeneity of culture,
It is perhaps significant that “Islam” itself is not a state but is, in one sense a “nation”, a groups of people(s) which identify primarily wiith one world-view and one system of laws — that determined by The Book. And just what that Book tolerates of other faiths has been a matter of dispute for centuries.
In all of this, some words of wisdom from a most unlikely source (but then again maybe not so unlikely) keep popping into my head: “The only real power is the power you seize” — J. R. Ewing,
Dallas. Frightening.
Watching the events in Egypt our loyalties are fractured. Yes, we want to Egyptian crowds to prevail over their oppressors. Yes, we want protection for the Egyptian Coptic Catholics and the Americans at the airports hoping to leave.
Good guys, bad guys. Good guys, bad guys.
Complexity, complexity.
Eugene –
What is the causal connection between Saddam Hussein and Mr. Kato?
Surely you don’t blame Kato’s death on Hussein (already dead)? What is the actual, real, ontological connection between the two? I mean Hussein was a monster, but why mention him in the same breath as Kato?
“(Like, ahem, Saddam Hussein.)”
So you supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to oust Hussein?
An Egyptian born profesor here on CNN a few nights ago noted that Mubarak was a military man, “a policeman”, whose vision could not grasp beyond the nerd for order.
I thought that was a good insight about the current Egyptian situation and Mubarak trying to hang on. Fear of disorder has marked the regime and will complicate the hoped for transition to demoratic rule.
I think thee is some analogy in this to other Islamic states in the area.
But change is clearly in the air and not driven by religious but, to a large degree, by “secular” motives.
Fear will dictate going back to power/control kinds of leadership- but if we are reshaping our own policies (as i think we must), we’ve got to be motivated by continuing engagement and moving forward.
Mubarak, like the Shah, has spent the better part of 30 years deliberately hollowing out any non-Islamic civil or political organization that might present a secular alternative to his rule. Mubarak, also like the Shah, did not dare to try the same tactics with Islamic organizations — for one thing, Islam is generally not all that “structured,” and for another, it’s hard to arrest people for praying. The Iranian revolution wasn’t destined to be religious in nature — it became that way by default, and has proven extraordinarily durable as a political force in Iran. I actually do not see Egypt going the same route as Iran, and I am also frankly puzzled by the premise here — is Kuwait an “Islamic” state? (Not really — not like Saudi Arabia.) Is it not stable? It strikes me that this is one case where the assumption as a whole is not supported by facts in evidence.
The secular/religious axis is an interesting way to analyze the region, but I’d think that at least as important would be the dictatorship/democracy axis.
It may be useful to ask how successfuly majority-Islam democracies have accommodated religion and religious-oriented parties. Mednicoff mentions Morocco as a place where multiple parties thrive. Turkey seems to be accommodating its Islamic party without major internal upheaval. What part has Islam played in Pakistan’s troubled democratic experience? Indonesia? Gaza Strip? Even Iraq?
Was the upheaval in Iran last year a secularist reaction, or was it a demand for freedom and autonomy from the dictatorship of the mullahs? Both?
(Just asking the questions; I’m not wonkish enough to know the answers. :-))
Unless they shut down the internet this change in Egypt will be different. This is the first revolution driven by the internet. The organizers used Facebook and Email to plan the demonstrations and informed people where and when to go. If a new government comes in and does not effect real change people will demonstrate again. Government cannot control the internet. In the US people rightly object to the president having the power to shut down the internet even for reasons of terror. This revolution is therefore different and no one can really predict what will happen. But oppressors and liars have to beware. Transparency is there to confront.
FWIW – it seems to me that the Holy See has been pretty consistent in advocating for the rights of Christian minorities in majority-Muslim countries. Everything I read suggests that Saddam Hussein’s regime tolerated the Christians in Iraq more than every form of government (or lack thereof) that has come after. So that, together with the experience of Copts in Egypt as reported here, suggests that strongmen in that region are more tolerant of Christianity more than are other forms of government.
I understand that in democratic, trending-less-secular Turkey, the Greek Orthodox church is under incredible stress – they have gone from something like 10% of the population to a tiny minority in the course of a generation.
This NYT article presents some views Israeli views:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/31/world/middleeast/31israel.html?_r=1&src=me&ref=homepage
Here is an interesting piece by David Bentley Hart on the perilous position of Christians in Iraq today, and their little-known glorious history.
http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2011/01/the-church-of-the-east
Ann — There is no causal or any other connection between Saddam and Kato. My point, directed to Lisa’s final question, was that we shouldn’t care one iota what the religious right thinks about anything. They’ve supported the murderous homophobia in Uganda — and so, I ask again, who the hell cares what they think about Egypt, or any other place in the region? Their vile and barbarous bigotry should be clear to anyone. We already know what leaders such as Franklin Graham and John Hagee think: the more dead Muslims, the better.
Flanagan — No, I didn’t support the invasion. I marched against it. In case you didn’t notice, my point was that helping to eliminate the secular left in nations like Iraq gave the United States secular authoritarian allies such as Saddam — and Mubarak.
I need guidance on what “secular” means in an Islamic context (I sometimes wonder what it means in a western context, but that’s another issue). Which Western-style secular states have we supported? Certainly not Mubarak’s Egypt, which, however secular it might be, is hardly “western-style.” Equating “secularity” with “western style” seems rather odd, when one considers such thoroughly secular entities as the Soviet empire prior to 1989, and the Chinese empire of Mao and his successors.
I forget where I read it recently, but apparently an Arabic word which is usually translated as “secular” means something more like “atheistic” in Arabic. The Vatican, at least, doesn’t translate it as “secular” anymore and avoids using the term when writing in Arabic.
Nicholas, I’m glad you asked about what secular means, as it isn’t clear to me, either. I know that Turkey is often named as an example of a secular Muslim state (or at least it used to be – I understand an Islamic party now rules). Does “secular” mean “tolerant of all religions; not favoring Islam over others”?
Here’s the little I know about the conditions of secularism in Egypt and Turkey. I trust and hope someone will correct me if my information is wrong or out of date.
The current Egyptian constitution (1971) recognizes Islam as the religion of the state and Muslim jurisprudence as the principal source of legislation. Government ID cards — necessary for most official documents including passports, marriage and birth certificates, and even certain documents necessary for college admission, rental agreements and employment — declare the holder’s religion: Islam, Christianity, or Judaism. Since 2009, a fourth option (a dash with no further specification) for all others has been added. Conversions to Islam are recognized by the Egyptian state and the ID card is changed accordingly. Conversions from Islam are not. If a Muslim converts to Coptic Christianity, s/he remains officially Muslim. Those who object are severely limited in their choices for housing, travel, education, employment and marriage. A 2009 US State Department report stated that Egyptian government “…authorities periodically charge converts with violating laws prohibiting the falsification of documents. In such instances, converts who have no legal means to register their change in religious status sometimes resort to soliciting illicit identity papers, often by submitting fraudulent supporting documents or bribing the Government Clerks who process the documents.”
The Orthodox minority in modern Turkey continues to shrink, a process that accelerated with the Istanbul pogrom in the 1950s. (Ethnic relations between Turks and Greeks have been bad for centuries, with bad behavior on all sides.) Turkish law requires the Ecumenical Patriarch to be a Turkish-born citizen (since the secular government denies the Ecumenical part of the Patriarch’s title, asserting that Bartholomew I is merely the leader of Turkish Orthodox), though the supply of Turkish-born Orthodox priests is very small, particularly after the Turkish government forcibly closed the school at Halki, the principal Orthodox seminary and college of theology, in 1971. (Despite many campaigns and pleas to permit it to reopen, it remains closed, though the Patriarch was able to stop the Turkish government from completely demolishing the Chapel of the Transfiguration there in 2007). Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered last year to relax the restriction on citizenship. I don’t know if this has altered Bartholomew’s public concerns that he may, in fact, be the last Ecumenical Patriarch, a line which, by tradition, dates to Andrew the Apostle. Of note, the doors to the Phanar have been welded shut since 1821, after Patriarch Gregory V was publicly hung, in his vestments, by the Ottomans.
I won’t rehearse the history of Turkish-Armenian relations here, since I trust they are well known to Commonweal readers, though I do recall hearing a Muslim scholar who said that what happened to the Armenians at the hands of the Turks was a consequence of secularization and should not be blamed on Muslims. I have no means to evaluate such a claim.
Of further note, Amy Frykholm today posted a helpful and much-needed corrective to conventional Western assumptions about secularity, religion, and conflict:
http://www.christiancentury.org/blogs/archive/2011-02/no-religious-dimension
Brian Volck, thanks for that comment on Egypt and Turkey.
Here is Richard Cohen on the prospect of Egyptian democracy (seemingly strengthened by Mubarak’s announcement that he will not seek re-election): “I care about democratic values, but they are worse than useless in societies that have no tradition of tolerance or respect for minority rights.”
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/02/01/brotherhood_of_hate_108725.html
One of the interesting developments in the current situation in Egypt is that the Muslim Brotherhood, the strongest opposition force in Egypt politically, has denied any role in the burgeoning protest movement. Furthermore, it has now given support to El Barradai as the voice of leadership — someone from outside their ranks, and a “secular” figure. I’ve wondered whether this is a cynical move, to see how it goes with an expendable first try, or whether it betokens a willingness to join forces with more secular Egyptians. If I understand the post correctly, this outcome was unforeseen. It rather supports a different view: secular leaders can be supported by Islamists.
It may not happen everywhere, but Egypt is not just anywhere. The nationalist movement that succeeded in their previous revolution, after all, was secular; Egyptians have some history and heroes here for whom religion was not the engine of politics. Let’s remember that the rise of religious fundamentalism in Islam is a recent phenomenon and the history of Egypt is long and complex.
This whole thing is fascinating. I just hope they reach a provisional solution soon, so that life can go on for ordinary people, who are not able currently to buy food or be paid while everything remains in chaos. In the Times today, the estimate of ordinary Egyptians interviewed was: they have one week.
Jim P., I think Cohen is more concerned about Israel than about anything else. It colors all his perceptions. If the writer he cites is his main source about the Muslim Brotherhood, and he was killed in 1966, how up to date is his knowledge? It’s enough for him to associate the Muslim Brotherhood with Hamas to condemn the whole thing. The economic situation is stagnant, true enough, but otherwise the Cohen piece offers little insight, istm.
Brian Volck, you said you were going to speak about the conditions of secularism in Egypt and Turkey, but in Turkey you only addressed the situation of the ecumenical patriarchate and the orthodox.
This view leaves out much of what the people of Turkey know as secularism, which was the broad development aggressively pursued under Mustafa Kamal Ataturk which affected everyone’s lives, Muslims especially. I am not an expert on any of this either, but I do know Ataturk enacted many reforms to reduce the power of the mullahs. He banned the fez and the headscarf, imposed the Roman alphabet, opened education to women, and generally pulled Turkey into the modern age. The military in Turkey remain the great upholders of secularism, which has been waning in recent years as Islamic political movements have arisen in the later 20th century. But the society as a whole remains affected by its secular history more than your account would suggest. When Muslim Turkish women argue for wearing the headscarf at University today for instance (it was forbidden), it’s on a basis of their “rights” — a secular concept.
Rita:
You are correct. Thank you for your helpful additions to my rather limited treatment of Turkish secularism.
Ataturk is indeed an fascinating figure, including his WWI military experience, his determined formation of a one party state with the military as the perpetual guardian of secularism, and the aggressive modernization project you describe above. I think he even had the Quran translated into modern Turkish and read over the radio to “teach people who had been practicing Islam without understanding it.” Ataturk’s one party system gave way to a multiparty parliament after WWII, and the current, conspicuously less secular parliamentary majority would no doubt trouble him if he were still alive, but they came to power, I believe, after alternative secular parties discredited themselves through scandal and inefficacy.
In creating a military nation-state on a Western European model, Atatruk transformed not only a country but a culture. If I remember correctly, one of the objections to Turkish admission to the EU is the national law criminalizing any remark or act that disparages his memory.
Thanks again for your comment. Perhaps you or someone else can add something about modern Turkey’s efforts to forcibly assimilate the predominately Muslim Kurdish minority.
I think this thread may be dead, but I came across these articles today which I think are germane to the discussion and I wanted to add them.
First there is this from a Comboni father who lives and works in Cairo. He brings a witness that the protests are about democracy and are not at all an occasion for interreligious strife. Rather, young Christians and Muslims both protest together in a mutually supportive way.
http://www.fides.org/aree/news/newsdet.php?idnews=28237&lan=eng
Impossible? Not at all. Recall that when the Copts were attacked, thousands of Muslims turned out to serve as human sheilds for their Christmas liturgy.
The climate in Cairo has changed today because of the violence introduced by pro-Mubarak demonstrators.
http://www.fides.org/aree/news/newsdet.php?idnews=28241&lan=eng
And, finally, in this story we hear from the former head of the pope’s council on interreligious dialogue: Archbishop Fitzgerald (the most accomplished scholar of the Muslim world working in the Vatican) who, you may remember, was sidelined when Benedict took over — and sent to Egypt. He too reports that the protesters are saying they are Egyptians, not we are Muslims. Sectarian cries are being hushed, in favor of all inclusive ones.
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/church-leaders-see-signs-of-new-unity-among-christians-and-muslims/
Such stories lead me to think it is entirely wrong to cast the current situation in the old mold of “secular tyrants vs. Muslim militants.” Something new is happening. (Some have even asserted that the Muslim movements have lost credibility with the youth because they have so far failed to deliver anything but more misery.)
Whom should the United States ally itself seems to be the question in this post. I would say we should ally ourselves where the life is: in this case, the demonstrators. They have been peaceful for the most part, young, and composed of members of all sectors of Egyptian life. They need help, because they are not organized, they have not got well-identified leaders, and they are likely to be hurt badly. But they are, for now at least, on the right side of history.
Thanks, Rita. That does sound rather hopeful. Perhaps the young are turning against the Islamists.
Sayyid Qutb, one of the first if not the first, highly influential Islamist theorists, was an Egyptian (b. 1906). Maybe the Egyptian intellectuals have had enough time to digest what he preached and are among the first to see that his radical path isn’t the best way for Muslims to go.
Re: Brian Volck 02/01/2011 – 1:18 pm
Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew has expressed optimism as late as May 2010 that Turkey will next year reopen the historic Halki seminary on the island of Hebeyliada that was shut down nearly four decades ago.