Prayer and argument
Today’s reading in the Divine Office is an excerpt from the prayer with which St. Ansem of Canterbury (or, as Italians know him, Anselm of Aosta) began his Proslogion. This is the work in which he set out what came to be called the “ontological argument” for the existence of God which, disputed in his own day, continues still today to attract serious philosophical and theological attention. The combination of serious and difficult philosophical and theological argument and deep prayer, as reflected here, is a striking illustration of the relationship between theology and holiness as reflected still in the saint’s work. He embodies the transition from monastic theology to the scholastic, that is, academic theology of the later Middle Ages. Here is the whole of the opening prayer, along with the brief concluding prayer, and his statement of the ontological argument.
Chapter I
Come now, little man,
flee your jobs for a moment,
hide a bit from your busy thoughts.
Throw aside your heavy cares
and disregard your laborious commitments.
Give a little time to God,
and rest a while in him.
“Go into the room” of your mind,
leave everything outside except God
and what helps you to seek him,
and then, “shut the door” and seek him (see Mt 6:6)
Say, now, all “my heart,” say to God,
“I seek your face;
Your face, Lord, I seek” (Ps 27:8)
And come you, too, Lord, my God,
teach my heart
where and how to seek you
where and how to find you.
Lord, if you are not here,
where shall I seek your absent self?
But if you are everywhere,
why do I not see you present?
You dwell in “light inaccessible” (1 Tim 6:16)
And where is this inaccessible light?
And how can I reach this inaccessible light?
And who will lead me and bring me into it
so that I may see you in it?
And in what signs, in what image, shall I seek you?
I have never seen you, Lord my God,
I do not know your face.
What shall he do, Lord most high,
what shall he do, this your distant exile?
What shall he do, your servant eager for your love,
and cast far “from your face” (Ps 51:13).
He pants to see you, and your face is too far from him.
He wants to approach you,
and your dwelling is inaccessible.
He desires to find you, and does not know where you are.
He aspires to seek you, and does not know your face.
Lord, you are my God, and you are my Lord,
and never have I seen you.
You made me and remade me,
and all my goods you gave to me,
and never have I seen you.
I was made to see you,
and still I have not done what I was made to do.
Wretched lot of man,
to have lost that for which he was made!
Hard and awful fall!
Ah, what he has lost and what he has found!
what has gone and what remains!
He lost the happiness for which he was made,
and found a misery for which he was not made.
That is gone without which nothing is happy,
that remains which of itself is wretched.
Then “man ate the bread of angels” (Ps 78:25)
for which now he only hungers;
now he eats “the bread of anxious toil” (Ps 127:2)
of which he then knew nothing.
Ah, the common distress of men,
the universal lament of the children of Adam!
Once he belched in his fullness,
now we sigh in our hunger.
He thrived,
we have to beg.
He happily enjoyed and wretchedly abandoned;
we are unhappy in our need and wretched in our desire
and, alas, empty we remain.
Why, when he could easily have done so,
did God not protect what we so keenly lack?
Why did God take away our light
and surround us with darkness?
Why did he take our life away
and inflict death upon us?
Wretched beings: from what have we been expelled!
toward what are we impelled!
From what heights cast down!
in what depths sunk!
From our homeland into exile,
from the sight of God into blindness.
From the joy of immortality
into the bitterness and horror of death.
What a wretched change!
From so great a good to so great an evil!
Painful loss, painful grief, everything painful.
Ah wretched me,
one of the many wretched children of Eve
far from God:
what have I tried to do, what have I done?
What did I seek to be, and what have I become?
To what did I aspire, for what things did I long?
“I sought good things,” and “behold terror” (Jer 14:19)
I sought God and bumped into myself.
I sought rest within me
and “found distress and anguish” in my depths (Ps 116:3).
I wanted to laugh in the joy of my mind,
and I am forced to groan “because of the tumult of my heart” (Ps 38:9).
I hoped for delight,
and see how thickly come my sighs!
And “you, Lord, how long?” (Ps 6:4)
“How long, Lord, will you forget us,
how long will you turn your face from us?” (Ps 13:1)
When will you look and hear us?
When will you give light to our eyes
and show us “your face”? (Ps 80:4)
When will you give yourself back to us?
Look upon us, Lord, hear us, illumine us,
show us yourself.
So that things may be well with us,
give yourself back to us,
yourself without whom all goes ill with us.
Have pity on our efforts and struggles toward you,
on us who can do nothing without you.
You invite us: well, then, help us.
I am pleading, Lord:
let me not despair in my sighing,
let me in hope breathe again.
I am pleading, Lord,
my heart is bitter in its desolation,
sweeten it with your consolation.
I am pleading, Lord,
hungry I began to seek you,
when I cease, let me not still hunger for you.
I drew near starving,
let me not go away unfed.
I have come as one poor to one rich,
one pitiful to one full of pity,
let me not go away empty and spurned.
And if I “must sigh before I eat” (Job 3:24),
at least, after my sighs, give me something to eat.
Bent over as I am, Lord,
I can only look down;
raise me so that I can look up.
“My iniquities have gone over my head”;
they surround me, “and like a heavy burden” weigh me down (Ps 38:5).
Free me, unburden me,
and do not let “the abyss” of them “close its mouth over me” (Ps 69:16).
Let me look upon your light,
from far away or from the depths.
Teach me to seek you,
and show yourself to one who seeks you,
for I can never seek you unless you teach me
nor find you unless you show yourself to me.
Let me seek you by desiring you,
desire you by seeking you.
Let me find you by loving you,
love you by finding you.
I confess, Lord, and give you thanks
that you created this your image in me
so that, remembering you,
I can think of you, love you.
But so effaced is this image by the wear of my vices,
so darkened by the smoke of my sins,
that it can no longer do what it was made to do,
unless you renew it and reshape it.
I am not trying, Lord, to penetrate your depths,
in no way do I compare my intellect to them;
but I desire in some way to understand your truth
which my heart believes and loves.
Nor am I seeking to understand in order to believe,
but I believe in order to understand.
For this also I believe:
that “unless I believe, I shall not understand” (Is 7:9).
Chapter XXVI
I pray you, God,
that I may know you, love you,
so that I may rejoice in you.
And if I cannot do so fully in this life,
let me make progress every day
until it comes to fullness.
Here let the knowledge of you grow
and there may it be full;
here let love for you grow,
and there may it be full,
so that here my joy may be great in hope
and there may be full in fact.
Lord, through your Son you command us,
advise us to ask,
and you promise that we will receive
so that “our joy may be complete” (Jn 16:24).
I ask, Lord–as you advise
through that wonderful counsellor of ours–,
to receive what you promise through your truth,
so that my joy may be complete.
Trustworthy God, I pray that I may receive
so that my joy may be complete.
Meanwhile, may my mind meditate on this
and my tongue speak of it.
May my heart love it,
may my mouth talk about it.
May my soul hunger for it,
my flesh thirst for it,
all my being desire it,
until I enter into “the joy of my Lord” (Mt 25:21),
who is God one and three,
“blessed for ever. Amen” (Rm 1:25).
And here’s Anselm’s argument for the existence of God:
Therefore, Lord, who grant understanding to faith, grant me that, in so far as you know it beneficial, I understand that you are as we believe and you are that which we believe.
Now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be imagined. Is there, then, no such nature, since “the fool has said in his heart: ‘God is not’”? But surely this very fool, when he hears what I am saying–”that than which nothing greater can be imagined”–understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his mind, even if he does not know that it exists. It is, after all, one thing for something to be in the mind and another to know that it exists.
For when a painter imagines beforehand what he is going to make, he has in his mind what he has not yet made but he does not yet know that it exists. When he has finished painting it, however, he both has in his mind what he has painted and knows that it exists.
Even the fool, then, has to agree that at least in his mind there is something than which nothing greater can be imagined, because when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in a mind.
But surely that than which nothing greater can be imagined cannot be in the mind alone. For if it is at least in the mind alone, it can be imagined to be in reality, too, which is something greater. If, then, that than which a greater cannot be imagined is in the mind alone, then the very thing than which a greater cannot be imagined is something than which a greater can be imagined. But certainly this cannot be. Beyond doubt, then, that than which nothing greater can be imagined exists both in the mind and in reality.
When students would say that there is something wrong with the argument, I’d challenge them to tell me what it is.
The text is online here if anybody wants it. (A few months ago, I scanned the Monologion from a library book; I’ll send it to that website soon.)
I think Gaunilo of Marmoutiers pretty convincingly demolished the ontological argument. If people think there’s something wrong with Gaunilo’s argument, I’d challenge them to say what it is.
Felapton, to begin with, it is in a language I don’t understand:-)
Thank you, Father Joseph, for this beautiful post.
Sorry, Nancy. Here is a translation.
Thank you, Felapton.
Another of St. Anslem’s prayers is the following one using maternal language for Christ. It is sometimes used in Anglican/Episcopal liturgy:
Jesus, as a mother you gather your people to you;
you are gentle with us as a mother with her children.
Often you weep over our sins and our pride,
tenderly you draw us from hatred and judgment.
You comfort us in sorrow and bind up our wounds,
in sickness you nurse us and with pure milk you feed us.
Jesus, by your dying, we are born to new life;
by your anguish and labor we come forth in joy.
Despair turns to hope through your sweet goodness;
through your gentleness, we find comfort in fear.
Your warmth gives life to the dead,
your touch makes sinners righteous.
Lord Jesus, in your mercy, heal us;
in your love and tenderness, remake us.
In your compassion, bring grace and forgiveness,
for the beauty of heaven, may your love prepare us.
Felapton: From either direction, it would make for an interesting discussion.
JAK –
What a great prayer. Woody Allen would appreciate it. I’ve never seen it before. It never appeared in the Intro. to Philosophy text books that so often include the great argument. What a different view of the Middle Ages it suggests. And what an amazing man St. Anselm must have been.
Ann and others:
Let me recommend the “Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm” (Penguin Paper) edited by Benedicta Ward. Her introduction is quite brilliant; the prayers mark a turning point in the West towards a greater affectivity towards the humanity of Christ. There is a (not) straight line from Anselm to the Cistercians of the 12th century to Francis.
One starting point to appreciatre the monologion and the proslogion is reminding ourselves that he begins everything wihin the context of lectio divina. Balthasar, by the bye, has a brilliant chapter on Anselm in The Glory of the Lord: Clerical Styles.
Prof. Cunningham ==
Thanks for the recommendations :-)
It’s the combination of rationality and deep feeling and appreciation for concrete beauty that I find so appealing in medieval writers. It’s their influence, no doubt, that doesn’t allow me to share the anti-intellectualism of the American culture. And Americans seem to become more and more anti-thinking as time goes on. The Puritans and the Virginian intellectual founders of this country certainly weren’t anti-intellectual. On the contrary.
Now, if the term “egg-head” gets stuck to a politician as happened with Adlai Stevenson, he/she is automatically eliminated from consideration for office. Obama had to fight against that slur too, and I still hear it hurled at him. It’s one of Sarah Palin’s favorite missiles (she who thought Africa was a country). At least Glen Beck knows there’s such a thing as a history book.
As if anyone can live a human life without both logic and feeling and beauty. But Americans continue to denigrate logic all the time. That attitude is actually one of the big problems in the inner city schools — black boys think that being a scholar is sissy. St. Anselm, pray for us! He, by the way, was also known for playing hard-ball politics with the kings of England — and he usually won. Yay, egg-heads :-)
“Felapton: From either direction, it would make for an interesting discussion.”
Itaque temptabo. (Fer auxilium Gaunilo!)
Argumentum totum MV* ex illa sententia dependere, in qua scriptum est id quod in mundo exsistat ex necessitate majorem esse illo quod in mente exsistat. Quae sententia non falsum enim videtur esse, dum re vera omnino ei deest significatio.
Quomodo enim possunt conferri res quorum una conceptio sit in mente humana et altera res materialis? Si haec conferemus qualitate, ut dicant doctores scholastici (Cf. Monologion, capitulum primum) omnino luceret primam majorem esse altera, cum mens pars sit animi immortalis et mundus limo lutoque licet multo compositio, quae in fine dierum tota evanuerit.
Fortasse autem res illae comparandae sunt in quantitate vel in magnitudine spatii in quo possint locari, sicut credamus mentem contineri possit cranio, qui possit contineri mundo, ex quo mens mundo. Quam doctrinam tam confidenter praedicatam discipulis Platonis nunc omnes suspiciunt falsam esse. Nam particula electronica, quibus nulla mensura possit aptari, possunt valere apud alterutra dum spatia maxima inter se jacent. Nobis itaque quaestio iam patere aestimanda est num contineat cranium mentem omnem hominis. Fieri potest mens similior esse instrumento electronico qui recipiat undas electromagneticas ab instrumento longe distante, cum in re mentis
putaremus instrumentum quod mittat signa situm posse extra mundo physicali. Illo modo, conceptio quae exsistit in mente majorem possit etiam quantitate mundo toto physicali.
In rebus mathematicis multi sunt qui non possunt comparari. Exemplum dant numeri. Numeri veri possunt magnitudine ordinari, cum numeri complicati non possunt. Illo modo, omnia quae sunt in universo physicali possunt comparari et quantitate et (majore cum difficultate) qualitate. Num illa quae sunt in mente humana possint comparari aut alterutris aut rebus physicalibus, dubium maximum adhuc adest. (IOHM)
*acronyms
MV = mihi videtur
IOHM = in opinione humilissima mea
[Obtranslation]
The entire argument ISTM depends on the sentence, “That which exists in the world is greater than that which exists in the mind.”
But this statement seems to be not even false but really meaningless.
For how can things be compared of which one is a concept contained in the mind and the other a material object? If the comparison is, as the scholastics say, “in quality” then it is clear that the first is greater than the second, for the mind is a part of the immortal soul and the world is merely mud and clay (albeit quite a bit) which will vanish at the end of days.
Perhaps, however, the comparison is to be made “in quantity,” assuming that whatever is in the mind must be contained within the skull of the person thinking it, and the skull is contained within the world so therefore the mind must be contained in the world.
But this principle, so confidently promulgated by the disciples of Plato, is now known to be highly dubious. For electrons, which are infinitely smaller than a skull, can interact across very large distances. It is therefore an open question whether all physical phenomena corresponding to human thought can be considered to take place within the human brain. It is possible that the brain is a sort of radio receiver which receives signals from some transmitter which exists beyond this universe. Then the idea in the mind, being partly in this world and partly not, would be larger in size than the entire world.
In math, there are a lot of things which can’t be compared with each other (sets on which no order relation is defined.) For example, real numbers are ordered, whereas complex numbers are not. Even thus things which have their existence in the physical universe can be compared to each other in size and (although this is harder) “in quality.” Whether conceptions in the human mind can be compared either with physical objects or with each other is doubtful.
Perhaps St. Anselm’s robust prayer might function as an epilogue to Job’s laments by allowing him to still offer his plaints but now leavened by the gift of ongoing intimacy with a Paschal Lord.
“For how can things be compared of which one is a concept contained in the mind and the other a material object? If the comparison is, as the scholastics say, “in quality” then it is clear that the first is greater than the second, for the mind is a part of the immortal soul and the world is merely mud and clay (albeit quite a bit) which will vanish at the end of days”
Ummm, not exactly. Let me make several points:
** As to comparisons, for many scholastics “the great” includes “the small” so there is no real opposition between them. See their hugely popular notion of the great chain of being.
** The mind is not “part” of the soul for most scholastics, I’d say, though it is necessarily related to it. And the world isn’t merely “mud”. I take it you mean “matter” in an ordinary sense of the word?
** I agree that Plato’s theory of the superiority of “forms” can be criticized on various grounds. Let’s say your Dad says to you, “I’ll take you to the merry-go-round this afternoon”. “What’s a merry-go-round?” you ask. So he describes one. You form a thought of a merry-go-round, then later go to see it and ride on it. It exists in the real world, you think, not just in my mind. The best part is that you can ride on the extra-mental one, but not really on the mental one.
So which is better? Obviously, the real one, the one whose gold ring you can really catch. That Platonic “form” in your mind doesn’t have nearly the value of the one in the park.
** In fact, contrary to Gaunilon, we do compare thoughts and extra-mental things all the time. So Gaunilon does have a very real problem, even though his thought tell him Anselm has the problem. (I say they BOTH have problems.)
Felapton/Gaunilon says: “Perhaps, however, the comparison is to be made “in quantity,” assuming that whatever is in the mind must be contained within the skull of the person thinking it, and the skull is contained within the world so therefore the mind must be contained in the world.”
I respond: It is not correct to speak of the mind being “contained” in the skull as if it were itself something with 3-dimensions. For the scholastics human minds (intellects) are dimensionless and are said to “be present in” the body, though I’ve seen a scholastic-phenomenologist say “the intellect is present TO” the body. (I rather like that myself.)
It is because human souls are dimensionless that they can be in more than one place at once, unlike a hunk of clay. Some contemporary physicists are talking about certain “material” or “physical” sub-atomic particles being in more than one place at once. You seem to be talking about them yourself above. Those physicists are actually “smarting up” the meaning of the words “matter”/”physical”: they are saying some bits of “matter” a property which the scholastics said was a property of spirit alone. In other words, they’ve changed the meaning of “matter”/”physical object”.
See how the meanings of basic words get changed over time? “Matter” used to mean something with 3 dimensions. Now for some physicists it can mean something that is not 3-dimensional in a Newtonian sense of “dimension”.
The reason I keep comparing the ancients and our contemporaries is because the ancient meanings and their variations are deeply imbedded in ordinary language and especially in Western legal language, and because ancients still have a lot to offer when it comes to the most basic ideas in metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of man. I say no use re=inventing the wheel.
Felapton: Isn’t the key sentence this? “It is a greater thing to exist both in the mind and in reality than to exist merely in the mind.”
Hi Ann/Anselm,
Gaudeo vero nos in illo consentiri, quod argumentum ut validum inveniatur in doctrinam formarum Platonis non potest fulcire. Quae doctrina credo iam diu ex lectulo iacta esse.
Nam ratio illa clarissime lucet, quod si doctrinae formarum crederetur, argumentum Sancti Anselmi statim acceptandum esset omnibus. Maxime autem valet haec doctrina cum de rebus mathematicis disputemus. Exemplum dat triangulum in plano jacens, cuius imago in mente lineas punctaque sine amplitudine imago in plano lineas punctaque amplitudinis definiti habet. Animadvertandum est tamen in hoc exemplo imaginem in mente perfectam esse ex illo, quod res imperfectas rei physicalis imago non habet, nec ex illo, quod aliqua habet imago quae non habet res ipsa.
At doctrina Platonis minime valet si quales investigemus tales reperiamus in mundo. Imago in mente humana de re physicali sola illa habet quae fuerit in omnibus (aut in majore parte) talibus rebus quas umquam antea sentierit mens in mundo. Itaque omnino non possum comprehendere quomodo imago mentis rei physicalis habeatur superior (major) originali.
Ratio doctrinae adhibendae videtur sic esse, quod haec res quae oriantur in mente imagines superiores rebus ipsis istae autem quae oriantur in mundo imagines inferiores habent in mente hominis. At Sanctus Anselmus conatur hoc per argumentum Deum demonstrare in mundo exsistere, ut ratio haec nos admoneret imaginem illius in mentibus nostris inferiorem esse.
Consequitur igitur doctrina Platonis nullo modo adhiberi potest in argumento. Aliqua ratio nobis quaerenda est.
[Obtrans]
I am glad to find that we agree that the argument must not rest on the Platonic doctrine of forms, because I believe that teaching has been definitvely debunked.
For it is clear to me that if one accepts the Platonic doctrine of forms, St. Anselms’ argument makes perfect sense. The doctrine of forms, after all, is most convincing when its subject is mathematical objects. For it is clear that any real triangle drawn in the plane must be less pefect than the ideal triangle in the mind, having, for example, edges and vertices of finite extent. But note that in this case the perfection of the mental image consists in an absense of the imperfections of the real objects rather than the presence of additional properties that the original may not have.
But the Platonic doctrine is less useful in the case of real objects. The mental image one forms of a real object, being an abstraction of all observations of such a thing transmitted through the sense organs, is less accurate than any real counterpart. Accordingly, I cannot see how the mental image of an object that exists in the world can be regarded as superior to its worldly counterpart.
The principle seems to be that things which originate in the mind (e.g., triangles) have mental images superior to the physical objects they are applied to, whereas things which originate in the world have mental images inferior to the physical objects they refer to. But Saint Anselm is trying to establish that God is a thing in the world, which would lead us to expect our mental image of him to be inferior. Yet his argument depends on the mental image being superior.
So the Platonic doctrine of forms is not helpful. Some other line of argument is needed.
Hospes fili asserit argumentum de hac sententia dependere, quod “major” est quod exsistat in et mundo et mente illo quod exsistat in mente sola. At iterum MV nobis dicendum esse quae significatio habeat verbum “major” cum asseramus rem majorem esse imagine sua.
Consideremus imprimis rem physicalem, bananam per exemplum. Imago bananae exsistit in mente et banana potest in mundo exsistere. Illa quae exsistat in mundo vero major est in illo, quod in aliquo spatio sita est et demissa potest res alias ut moveant efficere. Potentes habet quas non habent merae imagines.
Attamen banana maxima quae possit aliquis imaginari in mundo inveniri non potest. Nam quisque bananam videns potest bananam majorem imaginari. Quot bananas invenimus in mundo tot bananas possumus imaginari majores. Ideo videtur banana maxima quae aliquis possit imaginari semper in menta imaginantis invenietur nec in mundo.
Ad Gaunilonem refutandum aut exponendum est nobis quomodo Deus dissimilis sit bananae, aut quomodo id quod hic nuncupamus magnitudinem dissimile sit magnitudinis spatii. Quod nisi exponamus, reperiemus nos solum demonstrasse universum exsistere, quod utique iam omnes sciunt.
[Obtrans]
Father Komonchak/Anselm assert it is “greater” for a thing to exist both in the world and in the mind than only in the mind. But before this can be asserted, we must say what it means for a thing to be greater than its own mental image.
Consider a physical object, like a banana. The image of the banana is in the mind and the banana is in the world. The banana in the world has size and weight, occupies space and, if dropped for example, can cause other things to move. In this sense it is greater than its image, because it has powers the image does not.
And yet, the greatest banana that can be imagined does not exist. On the contrary, for every banana which exists, one can conceive a mental image of a banana larger than that one. So it seems the greatest banana that exists will always be merely a mental image and not a real banana. This is Gaunilo’s argument.
To refute Gaunilo, we must either explain how God is not like the banana or how the greatness we are describing is not merely like the greatness of a physical object. Otherwise, we will have succeeded only in proving that the universe exists, and we already knew that.
Anselm’s phrase is: “id quo maius cogitari nequit.” Here “maius” surely does not mean “larger,” “bigger,” “greater” (in a physical sense), but “more important,” “more “valuable,” “better,” etc., or some one of the very large meanings associated with “magnus, maior, maximus” that go beyond the literal, physical meaning. Instead of bananas, may I suggest: Quis maior est, equus an unicornuus?
Felapton –
Regardless of which is the greater reality — God extramentally or God thought about — the combination of two kinds of existence has to be better than just one, because the pair includes both the lesser and greater one, regardless of which it is that is greater. This, of course, implies a distinction between the essence and the existence of a thing, as well as implying that there are two different kinds of existence, Aquinas will later make a lot out of these distinctions, even though he rejected the proof.
Ann says: “the combination of two kinds of existence has to be better than just one”
Respondimus:
Non possumus dicere aliquid aliquo majus esse solam ob illam causam, quod exsistit in duobus modis dum alter exsistit in uno solo. Nam particula quae exsistant et in materia et in antimateria possunt annihilari, quod non accidit illis quae tantum in materia exsistant. Nec ullo modo possumus dicere id maius esse quod possit annihilari quam quod non possit.
It is not necessarily greater to exist in two ways rather than in one. For particles which exist as both matter and anti-matter can be anihilated, whereas those which are only matter can’t and surely it is not greater in any sense to be liable to anihilation.
Father Komonchak suggests we compare a horse and a unicorn, and says the comparison is not to be made in physical size but in some other way.
Assentimus. Res illae comparandae sunt non per magnitudinem spatii aut ponderis, sed per aliquam qualitatem.
Unicornuus major est equo in illa qualitate, quod plus habet potentiarum. Nam unicornuus potest
virginitatem agnoscere, quamvis unicornuus in mente exsistens solam potest virginitatem in mente agnoscere, et unicornuus dicitur immortalis esse. Equus autem major est in illa, quod partes ejus majore cum complexitate ordinatae sunt. Nam equus habet partes interiores quas non habet unicornuus, nisi homo in cujus mente unicornuus exsistat eas imaginetur.
Ideo iterum nobis dicendum est quomodo sciamus quale maius esse? Quaenam mensura utamur?
[Obtrans]
I agree. The comparison must not be made in mere quantity, but in some sort of quality. But which?
For the unicorn is greater in having greater powers, because unicorns are able to detect virginity, although only the virginity of mental conceptions, and they are believed to be immortal. On the other hand, the horse is greater in this sense, that it is more complex. For a horse has, for example, internal organs, which the unicorn does not unless the person in whose mind he exists imagines them.
Again we find it necessary to say what criterion we will use to determine which of the two is greater.
Score:
Gaunilo 14
Anselm 2
“It is not necessarily greater to exist in two ways rather than in one. For particles which exist as both matter and anti-matter can be anihilated, whereas those which are only matter can’t and surely it is not greater in any sense to be liable to anihilation.”
Felapton –
No, not always, but when the issue is whether or not it is better to exist in two *given* ways, one of which is (said to b) better than the other, then to exist both *of those particular ways* is better than just one way. If a bear is smarter than a bee, then it is better to have the smartness of both a bear and a bee. (What IS is like to be a bee?) If it is better to be a real God than only a mental one, then it is better to be what exists both mentally and extra-mentally.
(It seems to me the big problem is: is the God that “exists” in the mind identical with the one outside the mind? Anselm doesn’t get into that, unfortunately.)
(Yes, this is one of the great fun problems of all philosophy :-)
Ann: You asked: “What IS is like to be a bee?” Were you thinking of Thomas Nagel’s famous essay, “What is it like to be a bat?” The Philosophical Review 83 (1974) 435-50, or perhaps the following passage from Aquinas:
Someone says: “It’s stupid to believe what isn’t seen; things unseen are not to be believed.” I reply: First, the imperfection of our intellect does away with this objection. If a person were able to know perfectly all visible and invisible things, it would be stupid to believe what we do not see. But our knowledge is so weak that no philosopher has ever been able perfectly to investigate the nature of a single fly. That’s why we read that one philosopher spent thirty years in a desert, trying to get to know the nature of a bee. (St. Thomas, Preface to his comment on the Creed)
Sed dicit aliquis : stultum est credere quod non videtur, nec sunt credenda quae non videntur. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod hoc dubium primo tollit imperfectio intellectus nostri : nam si homo posset perfecte per se cognoscere omnia visibilia et invisibilia, stultum esset credere quae non videmus; sed cognitio nostra est adeo debilis quod nullus philosophus potuit unquam perfecte investigare naturam unius muscae : unde legitur, quod unus philosophus fuit triginta annis in solitudine, ut cognosceret naturam apis.
“If a bear is smarter than a bee, then it is better to have the smartness of both a bear and a bee.”
It seems to me that this analogical argument is not valid. Comparing intellects of bears and bees
is not similar to comparing the modes of existence of mental conceptions and a living deiety.
First because we know how to compare the understanding of a bear with that of a bee. For every
proposition that the bear understands, we can ask whether the bee understands it as well. Thus
it is possible, in principle, to evaluate all propositions which either species understands and
enumerate which understands more. But we still have not said how we can compare modes of
existence. In what way is it better to exist in reality than only in the mind?
Secondly because it is not possible for the bee to know anything to be true which the bear knows
to be false. But this is not the case with the two modes of existence. For mental conceptions can
do many things which real things can’t. For example, it is possible to conceive in the mind a
circle whose area is not pi times the square of its radius. But it is not possible for such a
circle to exist in reality. (I acknowledge this argument seems somewhat weak to me.)
[Obtrans]
MV hoc argumentum ex analogia deficere, cum intelligentiae ursi et apis valde dissimiles sint
illorum modorum exsistentiae de quibus disputemus.
Quod videndum est imprimis ex illo quod utique scimus quomodo intellegentiae ursi et apis
comparandae sunt. Nam quaeque sententia quam intellegat ursus apis aut intellegit aut
non intellegit. Sic possumus, si velimus, per omnes sententias cognitas aut urso aut api
lustrare, deinde enumerare quis illorum plures intelligat, et aestimare postea illum qui
plures sententias intelligat intelligentiorem esse. Sed de exsistentiis adhuc non diximus
quomodo sciamus quae amborum superet.
Nec potest fieri in casu intelligentiarum ut una intelligentia aliquid sciat verum esse quod
altera sciat falsum esse. Quod utique potest accidere in casu exsistentiarum. Persaepe enim
conceptio in mente potest id facere quod nulla res in mundo possit. Exempli gratia
consideremus circulum in mente conceptum cuius spatium non est radius ejus et per se
ipso et per numerum littera Graeca “pi” designatum multiplicatus, qui circulus utique
non potest exsistere in mundo.
Father Komonchak, I notice you have, perhaps inadvertently, pointed out at least two defects in the obtrans (Modification of “id” with “major” and third instead of second conjugation with “respondere.”) with what seems to be an enormous amount of tact.
The tact is very much appreciated but not quite necessary; I hope you’ll mention anything you notice. I would much rather straighten things out here with just you and Ann and Saint Anselm, then get it wrong in front of a more intimidating audience. It is vastly easier to remember grammatical errors when somebody else points them out than when one finds them oneself.
That it’s hard to say “pi-R-squared” in Latin, I already knew.
JAK –
No, actually I was thinking of Winnie-the-Pooh and the honey jar :-)
Thanks for the Aquinas text. It sounds so typical of him. Wouldn’t he have LOVED contemporary science!
I didn’t get through Nagel’s article. I think his question is ambiguous — he asks literally: what is it like to be a bat, but then the focus of his considerations is;: what is it like to *think like* a bat. Of course, they’re related, but, as a minority of one, I don’t think the article is up to his usual standards of clarity. Or maybe I just didn’t get his question.
(I also don’t understand St. T’s point here: :If a person were able to know perfectly all visible and invisible things, it would be stupid to believe what we do not see.” But that’s far afield from St. Anselm.)
Felapton: You can attribute any corrections to Aquinas, and your own alertness. I didn’t intend any.
Ann: I think St. Thomas’s point is that if you understood all things perfectly, you wouldn’t have to believe, and so it would be stupid to do so, or stupid to think that you’d need to.
Do you have any idea who the philosopher is who was said to have spent those decades trying to understand the bee?
“If a person were able to know perfectly all visible and invisible things, it would be stupid to believe what we do not see.”
Isn’t the point that, for example, if you knew all the different species of cephalopod and knew that you knew them all, then nobody could convince you that there was, for example, an octopus whose species you didn’t know, not even if he said he had seen it himself, while he was diving.
I don’t know about Saint Thomas, but Saint Albert would have loved contemporary science. Sometimes I tell him about what I’m doing when I pray. I suppose he knows it all now anyway.
No, I don’t know where Thomas got the bee story. Maybe from his mother who was a close cousin of the remarkable Emperor Frederick II who lived in Sicily. He was extremely interested in animals and even had a menagerie that included giraffes and an elephant. That is the sort of “philosopher” that I’m sure Frederick would have been interested in. She might have gotten the story via his court. I wonder if the story came from a Muslim scientist. Mention of a desert makes me wonder, and Frederick welcomed some Muslim scientists to his court. But that’s purely speculation.
:First because we know how to compare the understanding of a bear with that of a bee. ”
Felapton –
I think that’s the real question Nagel tries to get at in his famous article. Actually we don’t get into the “minds” of animals, so we don’t really know what is going on there, except perhaps by analogy — comparing their external behaviors with our own.
But from their behavior it seems safe to say that bears know a lot more things than bees because they do a vaariety of apparently directed actions (instinctive, no doubt) than do bees. They catch fish, for instance, and can ride unicycles (non-instinctive). Bees, on the other hand can make hives. But they seem *really* dumb. If you cut off the backs of a hive, the honey runs out, but the bees keep bringing the nectar and putting it in the hives. So I’d say we can say that bears are smarter.
The question of what animals “know” is actually a very interesting question in itself, about which Lisa Fullam probably knows a thing or two, and which is not altogether ungermane to epistemology. I read that an octopuses are very clever, they can solve problems that are hard for dogs. But it’s hard to compare the octopus’ understanding to the dog’s understanding, because dogs are a social species and octopuses are solitary. So when you teach a dog, for example, to fetch, you form a relationship with the dog and he “wants” in some sense to interact with you. But to the octopus, you are always just a shadow next to the tank which gives him food in complicated ways he has to figure out.
This is in addition to the usual difficulties in comparing dogs and octopuses, for example, that the octopus has to stay in a tank of water and the dog is color-blind.
This question occasionally arises when “cat people” try to convince “dog people” that cats are as smart as dogs but just not as eager to please humans. I don’t think that is a serious example, though. It is perfectly obvious to me that cats are just foul, stinking defecation machines which God created so cat people would have litter boxes to clean up.
I want to withdraw the second argument in my post from three o’clock yesterday. I have thought about it a bit more and decided the whole argument just stinks. Deduct two points from Gaunilo.
Basically, I no longer want to assert that it is possible to imagine a circle whose area is not “pi-r-squared.” I was thinking of the kids at the school where I volunteer, who opine all sorts of extraordinary things about math. (They are calculus students, so I hope nobody believes there are circles with area unequal to “pi-r-squared.”) But by the end of the year they will know all those things are not true.
So the case is similar to the one in Plato’s Meno. One can believe that one has imagined a circle with radius unequal to “pi-r-squared” but after seeing the proof, one realizes that one never did really believe it; that if its mental image was circular, its area was “pi-r-squared.”
(We assume we’re talking about circles in a Euclidean metric.)
Felapton –
When you retire you ought to go back to school for a philosophy degree. You have the sort of curiosity that philosophy teachers love to find in students :-) And you’re willing to change your mind, a rare quality in any group. Or maybe you could persuade your boss to let you sit in a course every semester. But start with the Greeks!!!!!!!!
But I warn you, the arguments over Anselm’s proof NEVER end.
Old Southern joke: a boy comes home announcing that he had studied “pi r squared” to which his granfather replied: pie are round; cornbread are squared.
Ouch :-)