A different episcopal voice
November 3, 2010, 8:49 pm
Posted by Joseph A. Komonchak
Here is a different way in which a bishop addresses Catholic responsibilities in voting. It’s from the Archbishop of New Orleans, Gregory Aymond. I know the Archbishop from the Catholic-Orthodox Theological Consultation and recognize in this video the same calm clarity he has brought as Catholic chairman of the dialogue.
Maybe what is most significant about the statement is that it was made so publicly. Can it be that the UCCB will allow some public disagreement among the bishops? And whatever will the Vatican say? Or is this just a trial balloon to see if anybody cares in the first place? I wonder how our “orthodox Catholic” confreres will react to this, if at all.
You’re right. This was definitely worth viewing. Thanks.
Ann, you may get a chance to see how they react later this month, as Aymond is one of the ten nominees for president of the conference. I hear he is well regarded, which is no mean feat these days.
Ann: It’s not a matter of the Bishops’ Conference “allowing” public disagreement among the bishops. It doesn’t have the authority to prohibit bishops from addressing their own Churches as they see fit, and if they do so, it’s not by way of permission from that body.
JAK —
In my experience wherever there is power to be had there are people seeking it. This is not necessarily bad, of course. But even in the most benign institutions there tend to be unwritten rules about what “is done” and what “is not done” by the members. Rule breakers are ostracized, not elected to the presidency. I don’t doubt that the bishops have their implicit rules/limits of behavior even though they’re not codified. Hopefully, they change.
Hello Ann (and All),
Since the content of his excellency Archbishop Aymond’s message is technically compatible with other messages from bishops regarding the responsibilities of Roman Catholic voters (I’m thinking in particular of the message from Archbishop Burke recently discussed here.), I doubt there will be much reaction from any of our friends at EWTN, First Things and related forums. (I’m assuming these are the Catholics you were referring to in your initial post.)
That said, I found Archbishop Aymond’s message quite refreshing and I infer a rather different recommendation from his excellency than I infer from the other messages I mentioned above. But this raises another interesting question. Since I don’t live in Archbishop Aymond’s diocese, exactly what if anything should be my response to his message? (The bishop of the diocese where I currently live issued no messages I know of directly related to this just completed election. Perhspa this is because he is currently seriously ill.)
I wonder if the USSCB’s governing rules allow the same bishop to serve as both the Vice President and the Chairman of the Committee on Divine Worship.
I’m not so sure about his nostalgia of campaigns in the past. Maybe in the 50s, but not in the 1800s, LOL:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_zTN4BXvYI
It’s nice to see this in Louisiana.
Didn’t Cao lose though ?
Beyond that, Catholic hierarchy in the heartland/rustbelt has moved from moderate progressivism to deeply conservative approaches such as we’v eseen in Detroit, Minneapolis etc.
All of that dates to the JPII appointments aand after and what they really bring to the table of input into the political scene.
And some, like the new Abp of New York are really cut from the same cloth of identity Church approach.
So It’s problematic to have a few voices crying in the wilderness.
“Since the content of his excellency Archbishop Aymond’s message is technically compatible with other messages from bishops regarding the responsibilities of Roman Catholic voters (I’m thinking in particular of the message from Archbishop Burke recently discussed here.)”
Hi, Peter –
I don’t see how Burke’s statement is consistent with Aymond’s. Aymond says he’ll never tell us to vote for a certain candidate. At least implicitly Burke says he is doing that — do not vote for the pro-choice candidate. Even if he didn’t mention a candidate by name in a run-off, if there are only two candidates he is in effect telling his flock whom they must vote for.
I sympathize with you. But it’s time to face the fact that 1) not all Catholic bishops are in agreement about this, and 2) what is wrong in one diocese can be right in another. Ultimately, the moral issue is: are we morally bound to be rational, i.e., to admit that there are contradictory teachings when we find them. I say we are. It’s a matter of truth-telling.
No, the Church has not always preached we must be rational about everything (life includes too many apparent contradictions), but the strongest Catholic tradition, it seems to me, is in favor of using reason to determine ethical truths, and when two bishops are not in agreement we know that one of them is wrong.
Bob N. –
Yes, Cao lost. But it was inevitable. The district is about 60% black and 60% liberal and his opponent is black, so the odds were too long. Cao did win against a crooked black man the first time, which shows that the black people don’t want crooks either, and our new mayor is white so that’s not an automatic disqualification here either. The elected guy is only a known perjurer. Apparently perjury doesn’t count as much as stealing around here.
Which raises the question: are Americans so inured to politicians lying that we don’t count it against them any more? Hmm.
Ann:
When you say, “the strongest Catholic tradition, it seems to me, is in favor of using reason to determine ethical truths, and when two bishops are not in agreement we know that one of them is wrong,” what do you mean by “strongest”?
Most effective? Most resonant with dominant tradition? Most coherent? Most likely to correspond to reality and objective values?
Note these need not all denote the same thing. I presume, unless I’m wrong, that you take the last item to be what you mean (given your other comments in other threads), though I think that would lead to very misleading dichotomy between reasons and emotions. Moreover, affirming the non-truths of contradictions, after all, is hardly sufficient for determining what is actually ethical, and it says nothing about reason’s capacity to perceive value.
Sorry Ann, that needed editing in parts upon rereading, but I take it that you’ll understand my questions.
Benjamin –
When I say using reason to answer ethical questions has been the strongest strain in Catholic moral theology I mean the strain that has had the most support from the popes and bishops. I’m thinking, of course, of the influence of Aquinas who ultimately became the official Church theologian. The Thomists position was generally buttressed by the Franciscan followers of Scotus et al. These were the moralists whose views were taught in the seminaries.
Yes, there is sometimes a dichotomy between feeling and reason. When that happens I think it’s safe to say that the Church almost always comes out down the side of reason. See it’s position on abortion, for instance. The whole defense of natural law theory is based on the premise that reason is what discovers what is so.
If you look up what the Catechism of the Catholic Church has to say on Natural Law and on Conscience you’ll find a strong emphasis on reason (with remarks also on the role of Bible and Magisterium in guiding and enlightening reason). This is quite liberating for Catholics who disagree with aspects of church moral teaching, since it challenges them to mount a rational argument and to pursue it patiently and confidently. A fundamentalist religion that appealed only to inerrant sacred texts would allow no such space for mature thinking to its adherents.
I find referring to servants of the servants of God as “his excellency” to be repugnant and wish that Catholicism would get over its Anglican pretensions.
Hi Ann and Joseph:
I guess I’m wondering how useful reliance on natural law’s understanding of reason (and reason devoid of emotions) is, both in light of the insights of some of this past century’s great theological minds and in light of the fact that our emotional life informs our use of reason (and our cognition) more than we’d like to admit. I’m not claiming we have to go all out Humean, but I am suggesting that, per Joseph’s comment that we are challenged “to mount a rational argument and to pursue it patiently and confidently” when we disagree with the Church, mounting a “rational” argument may in fact take into account that what appears rational to some is possibly motivated by something non-rational. If that’s the case, it would appear that ethical claims are not necessarily strongest when claiming to rely on pure reason.
And I’m not sure about Joseph’s other comment, namely, that “A fundamentalist religion that appealed only to inerrant sacred texts would allow no such space for mature thinking to its adherents” as if that doesn’t sometimes apply to the Church’s ethical stances. When I hear that we must believe something because both the Magisterium and natural law support it, I wonder if this is a chicken/egg claim or if it’s really just “adhere to the Magisterium because we are the only proper interpreters of natural law”–which is a fundamentalist claim, unless of course there are “reasons” independent of revelation that would suggest that we always must obey the Magisterium. (If that’s natural law, then why need the Magisterium? But it’s not.)
See the problem we’re facing?
Ultimately, I bring this up because Catholics of good will with full use of their rationality appear to disagree on many issues that are supposedly so clear according to natural law (a claim I don’t buy because of Aquinas–secondary precepts are precisely the precepts we disagree about!), but yet they are treated as if they are willfully irrational by some of nat law’s staunchest defenders. That’s a real problem.
I think he is speaking to all those nothern catholics who keep voting in pro abortion democrats
“I guess I’m wondering how useful reliance on natural law’s understanding of reason (and reason devoid of emotions) is, both in light of the insights of some of this past century’s great theological minds and in light of the fact that our emotional life informs our use of reason (and our cognition) more than we’d like to admit. ”
Benjamin –
Saying that “natural law devoid of emotions” makes it sound as if it had some sort of existence apart from the moralists themselves. It doesn’t, and there is no inconsistency in thinking that human emotions can help us understand human values. What the Catholic natural law moralists do not accept it that feeling alone is a good guide to what is moral. Yes, reason can be influenced by feelings. Feelings can make us focus on only some truths or suppress others or distort them. But feelings are subjective reactions and as such they tell us something about the one who feels, not something about the things he has feelings about. For instance, to say to me, “I”m terribly angry at the politicians” tells me something about you, not something about them, except that you are mad at them.
Are there any feelings which tell us something about the value of objective realities? I suspect that there are, but I don’t know how to tell the difference between them and the feelings that are just subjective reactions.
You also say, “I am suggesting that, per Joseph’s comment that we are challenged “to mount a rational argument and to pursue it patiently and confidently” when we disagree with the Church, mounting a “rational” argument may in fact take into account that what appears rational to some is possibly motivated by something non-rational. If that’s the case, it would appear that ethical claims are not necessarily strongest when claiming to rely on pure reason.”
That an argument appears as solid to some but not to others isn’t a failure of the laws of reason. Among other things, it could be sheer illogicality, of course, but the fault there is in the person not the logic. Or it could be that the premises of an argument have been distorted by feelings, but that doesn’t imply that feelings would be better than reason.
To be very precise about this, “pure reason” is the laws of logic, and they do not supply any premises. Only experience of the world can supply premises of an argument. Unfortunately, our experiences also are sometimes inadequate to represent the way things actually are. Again, this is not a failure of pure reason but of experience.
I agree that sometimes the Vatican’s claim of expertise in natural law ethics leaves much to be desired. But don’t get me started on that.
Hello Benjamin (and All),
Hope you don’t mind my piping in on your exchange with Ann and Joseph. I think I may have questions similar to yours, though I might phrase them somewhat differently. I teach elements of classical natural law theory straight from the original Aquinas somewhat regularly, and so far I have not found in Aquinas (or any other classical natural law theorist I know of) clear criteria for distinguishing between basic and secondary precepts of natural law. As you point out, it’s the secondary precepts that people who deliberate carefully might disagree on, and Aquinas admits this.
Aquinas also maintains that people are somewhat prone to making mistakes regarding what the natural specifically permits or requires because they are either misinformed regarding some of the relevant facts or somewhat corrupted by the sins in their cultures. Presumably this is why we need the magisterial of the Church for guidance. (This seems to be John Paul II’s position in Veritatis Splendor if my memory serves – I don’t have all my books with me just now.) Of course if this is the way we’re supposed to look at things then apparently those who promulgate magisterial teachings are not themselves prone to misinformation or corruption, which brings up the very complicated question of how and when Church teachings are infallible.
Aquinas was without doubt the greatest of the classical natural law theorists but even he drew some conclusions we 21st century people would regard real whoppers. For instance, Aquinas maintains that persistent heretics should be executed, same as counterfeiters should be executed. No contemporary natural law theorist would recommend capital punishment for persistent heretics, and Aquinas’ position is clearly incompatible with section 6 of Dignitatis Humanae.
Another interesting tidbit: At least two popes (in the 11th century I believe) declared that torture could be applied under certain circumstances so long as the victim’s life was not put in danger, which is plainly incompatible with both section 27 of Gaudiem et Spes and Veritatis Splendor. Best I can make of examples like these is that either Church teaching on morals really does develop over the centuries (which is what I think) or that sometimes pronouncements on morals from even popes are not really expressions of Church teaching.
Peter –
Some place in the Summa Theologica Aquinas gives several examples of some very fundamental principles of natural law. As I remember they included ‘you must not lie’ and ‘you must educate your children’. But he didn’t say the list was exhaustive, and I don’t think he actually says that they are most fundamental next to ‘Do good and avoid evil”. Neither does he derive them explicitly from synderesis (Do good and avoid evil) plus premises derived from experience. Such inductive generalizations (necessary in a natural law system) are one of the things I think his system most lacks.
Yes, I agree he’s definitely the greatest, but he recognized that his system didn’t answer all questions. He himself admitted that the less general principles are harder to apply the closer we get to actual, individual cases. Unfortunately, he had no decision procedure for determining *which* principles should apply in concrete cases, and I think that is often one of our great practical problems.
That our generalizations about human nature change shouldn’t surprise us. Hopefully we learn by experience. Some say the moral generalizations “develop”, but I think that’s a cop-out sometimes. The problem is we’re usually a little too hasty to generalize on the basis of only our own experiences. I supose that can’t be helped, but we need to recognize that our generalizations and, therefore, our principles are revisable.
Another very great problem for settling ethical issues within the Church is the ambiguity of the phrase “Church teachings”. That’s a semantic problem of the greatest importance, but it can’t be solved by ethics. It’s is a matter for the theologians to settle, but to do that they need to be experts on how language works, not to mention knowing what history to trust. (“History”. Another ambiguous word.) Yes, we need that theological epistemology. It would have to be a combination of psychology, philosophy, history (specifically tradition), linguistics, Scriptural studies (including literary criticism), etc., etc., etc. Where IS that new Aquinas???
Ann, the new Aquinas may be the faithful, ala Thomas Friedman: “The logic is that all of us are smarter than one of us, and the unique feature of today’s flat world is that you can actually tap the brains and skills of all of us, or at least more people in more places. Companies and countries that enable that will thrive more than those that don’t.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/opinion/17friedman.html
True for Churches too.
Jeanne –
Hmm. Yes the net makes a lot more intellectual ferment possible. But does it encourage thinking that causes paradigm change in fundamental concepts? I rather doubt it. I mean the breakthroughs of great generality and depth like Einstein in physics and Frege in math. Those sorts seem to be nurtured by small circles or sequences of extremely gifted intellects who knew each other and encouraged each other to new heights. It happened in Athens in the 5th-3rd centuries BC, in Paris/London in the 13th-14th centuries, and in Vienna/Berlin/Cambridge in the 20th century, plus in some constellations of artistic intellect in northern Italy in the Renaissance.
Maybe the internet will make it easier for today’s best brains to find each other, but I’m not optimistic. Social groups these days are just too big already and getting bigger.
Ann, just quickly, you’re right about your correction on pure reason; I was using shorthand to say “reason free of emotions,” but I’m still not sure we’re getting at the heart of the problem. That is, that just because we think we can nicely categorize everything by claiming that reason tells us how to adjudicate conflicts and access moral truths, it doesn’t make it true that it does so. And we have reason to think it does not actually do that because of what we’re learning about rationality from the sciences. (But I’m also thinking of theological insights from the great 20th century theologians.) Moreover, I think that actually, yes, an emotion is an affective perception of objective values, if you say you are find a situation pitiful, that’s making a claim not just about your feelings but also about the situation, namely, that it is a bad state to be in.
For this reason, this claim borders on questionbegging: “That an argument appears as solid to some but not to others isn’t a failure of the laws of reason. Among other things, it could be sheer illogicality, of course, but the fault there is in the person not the logic. Or it could be that the premises of an argument have been distorted by feelings, but that doesn’t imply that feelings would be better than reason.”
I agree, insofar as nothing is implied about the role of feelings over reason, but, at the same time, it relies on the assumption that reason would access these truths if unencumbered by emotions and illogical persons. I’m saying we have reason to question that.
Hello Ann (and All),
Thanks for the response. I think we agree fully on our interpretations of Aquinas’ natural law.
I also think it’s not always so easy to know what the Church teaches, since it’s my understanding that the hierarchy, the theologians and the entire Church (the sensus fidelium) all contribute to Church teaching and how these sources interact and produce teaching is complicated, to say the least. That said, it seems to me that papal encyclicals and the conciliar documents of Vatican II reflect Church teaching in its current state. (The theologians who participate here probably have better insights into this question than mine.) From what I’m about to say it will be clear I think we Catholics all need to learn the teachings of Vatican II in greater depth.
As for the Internet, my impression is that in the short run it’s actually contributing to more Balkanization among Catholics. And I’m admittedly guilty of contributing to the problem. I’ve learned (from colleagues in philosophy) of web communities of Roman Catholics who openly express hope for an all out war against Muslin people, anti-Semitism, and restrictions on religious freedom, in direct opposition to the teachings of Vatican II. (These are not members of the SSPX. And I assume they are not aware of the teachings of Vatican II.) Almost as soon as I learned of these and related web communities and read some of what appears in their posts I adopted a strict “hands off” policy towards them. I simply don’t think it’s good for my faith life to keep reading such expressions of hatred, even though I realize I should not be ostracizing fellow Catholics. (And for all I know I have met some of these people at Mass). Of course, I’m aware that some may raise analogous complaints against our Commonweal web community, since some of us have occasionally denounced other Church teachings such as the prohibition against contraception. What makes our web community different for me is that, with only a few notable exceptions, we generally treat each other with respect and allow for opposing views — I have always felt welcome here even though many participants occasionally disagree with me.
Benjamin –
I suspect we’re not very far apar about the basics. With Aquinas I think that de facto reason does not solve all our moral quandaries. My big problem with appealing to feelings is that though I think there are probably some feelings that tell us something about what is morally good or evil, I don’t know of any way to distinguish those feelings which tellus what is good from feelings which tell us that evil is good.
Eichmann loved to kill Jews and counted himself wise for doing so, while Bonhoffer wanted to save them. Both acted on feelings, but the feelings were contradictory. How do you tell the difference between the good one and the bad one? Looking for more facts which are non-feelings to justify the feelings just takes us back to having reason alone solve these matters.
I suspect that it is a combination of fact and feeling that is of use in some quandaries, but . . .
I look on feelings as information; they’re physical reactions to states of existence that we have to decode because sometimes the feelings are intuitive or otherwise not fully conscious (e.g., your gut telling you something’s wrong). So as information they need to be parsed by reason; that’s where the ultimate determination is made.