Diplomatic Defeat
How the Obama Administration Botched Negotiations in Honduras
Robert E. White
Last week it seemed all but certain that a resolution to the Honduran coup was at hand. After four months of political crisis, it looked like a U.S.-brokered deal had set the stage for a unity government that could see the return of ousted President Manuel Zelaya—not necessarily as president. According to the terms of the agreement, the Honduran Congress would decide his role. Then Zelaya suddenly announced the deal was “dead” because Congress had not moved to vote on the question of his reinstatement.
What went wrong? It is now possible to reconstruct with a fair degree of accuracy how the Obama administration turned an imminent diplomatic triumph into a negotiated defeat.
On October 20, Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) stated that he had met with Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon and was pleased that the Department of State finally understood “that it is essential that these elections [in Honduras] go forward and are recognized.” As a result, DeMint said he was “anxious” to release the holds he had placed on the nominations of Arturo Valenzuela to be Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Thomas Shannon, the present assistant secretary, to be ambassador to Brazil.
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As Shannon well knew, this impending policy change would give away the leverage the United States could use to persuade the de facto Honduran government to permit the prompt return of Zelaya. On October 28, a diplomatic delegation headed by Shannon arrived in Tegucigalpa to jump-start negotiations between the de facto regime and President Zelaya. At a press conference, Shannon said that Zelaya’s return was “central” to the concerns of the United States and the international community. Yet Shannon refused to say that his return was an essential component to any deal.
One could infer that de facto president Roberto Micheletti knew that the State Department had made a commitment to Sen. DeMint that the United States would recognize the upcoming November 29 elections as valid regardless of whether Zelaya returned to office. Under such circumstances any journeyman diplomat would immediately recognize that the only chance to achieve a lasting agreement would be to inform Zelaya of the change in U.S. policy. Armed with this information, Zelaya could have insisted on a firm date for his return. With the backing of the U.S. delegation, there would have been a fighting chance that Micheletti would have agreed because time was running out.
It was of course possible, even probable, that negotiations would have failed, but the result would have been infinitely preferable to the charade in which Zelaya signed an agreement under the illusion the United States would ensure his prompt reinstatement to power. The result of this cynical and amateurish diplomacy could hardly have been worse.
The secretary of state triumphantly announces a breakthrough in Honduras. Micheletti responds that he has not yet agreed to the restitution of the elected president, and a deceived Zelaya states the agreement is dead. The diplomatic fiasco is complete.
There is still room for diplomatic maneuvering. For example, at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United States could say that while it will recognize the outcome of the November 29 elections, it will support an OAS decision not to send observers to certify the elections. This would almost surely result in the immediate return of Zelaya, because the United States would have reaffirmed its resolve not to be separated from its hemispheric partners.
Unless the Obama administration acts quickly to rescue this bungled outcome, Zelaya will take the only road open to him and call for his supporters to boycott the elections. Most nations of the hemisphere will support him by refusing to recognize the elections, and the crisis will drag on.
It is sad to contemplate how the Obama administration botched a challenge in which it had the support of the entire hemisphere. Is it any wonder President Lula of Brazil has accused President Obama of going back on his promise of a new relationship with Latin America?
Robert E. White, a former United States ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay, is president of the Center for International Policy.
